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Abstract 
This study analyzes current regulation with respect to the use of derivatives and leverage by mutual 
funds in the U.S. and Germany. After presenting a detailed overview of U.S. and German regulations, 
this study thoroughly compares the level of flexibility funds have in both countries. I find that funds in 
the U.S. and Germany face limits on direct leverage (amount of bank borrowing) of up to 33% and 
10% of their net assets, respectively. Funds can extend these limits indirectly by using derivatives 
beyond their net assets (e.g., by selling credit default swaps protection with a notional amount equal 
to their net assets). Additionally, issuer-oriented rules in the U.S. and Germany account for issuer risk 
differently: U.S. funds have greater discretion to undervalue derivative exposure compared to 
German funds. All analyses of this study reveal that under existing derivative and leverage regulation, 
funds in both countries are able to increase risk by using derivatives up to the point at which it is 
possible for them to default solely due to investments in derivatives. The results of this study are 
highly relevant for the public and regulators. 
JEL-Classification: G15, G18 
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“Unfortunately, these risks were not made known to investors and stockbrokers failed to do even the 
most basic due diligence on the fund to learn of its high risk nature.”2
1 Introduction 
 
How much flexibility does U.S. and German/EU regulation offer regarding the use of derivatives and 
leverage by publicly available funds? In recent years, highly regulated market participants, including 
mutual funds, were heavily exposed to risk via derivative use; unfortunately, regulators failed to 
intervene before trouble ensued. Financial institutions, such as the American Insurance Group (AIG), 
Bear Stearns, and the Oppenheimer Champion Income Fund, were in headlines around the world 
because of their near collapse due to investments in credit default swaps (CDS).3 These funds were 
not the exception: The majority of U.S. corporate bond funds increased their CDS positions and faced 
higher risks during the 2007-2009 financial crisis (Adam and Guettler (2014)).4 As indicated by these 
recent events, the use of CDS might have a tremendous impact on the performance and risk of 
mutual funds, which is why it is important for the public to understand the flexibility offered by 
current mutual fund regulation.5
This study analyzes the U.S. and Germany/EU regulation of the use of derivatives and leverage by 
mutual funds by presenting the relevant rules and highlighting the main similarities and differences 
between both countries, especially regarding the level of flexibility. In particular, this study discusses 
the application of existing regulation for CDS, which came into the limelight during the financial crisis 
of 2007-2009 (e.g., Stulz (2010), and Brice (2011)), and its (un)intended consequences.
 
6
                                                          
2 “Recovering Oppenheimer Champion Fund Losses” [
 In addition, 
mutual funds in the EU follow the EU-wide regulation of the Undertakings in Collective Investment in 
Transferable Securities (UCITS) Directive 85/611/EEC, which, starting in 2001, broadened the 
flexibility of funds with regard to derivatives. Germany implemented this regulation in 2004 and is 
http://www.oppenheimerfundfraud.com/id3.html, visited on 
08.09.2012]. 
3 See “Recovering Oppenheimer Champion Fund Losses” [http://www.oppenheimerfundfraud.com/id3.html, visited on 
08.09.2012], and Brice (2011). AIG had to be rescued by the U.S. government because a large amount of future obligations 
from sold CDS contracts on mortgage backed securities fell suddenly and surpassed the size of its assets (Brice (2011)). 
4 Furthermore, Van Ofwegen, Verschoor, and Zwinkels (2012) find a relationship between credit derivative use and the 
insolvency risk of the 20 biggest European financial institutions. 
5 Publications of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), e.g., SEC Staff report (1994), SEC Letter to the GCotICI 
(2010), and the SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), suggest the importance of the derivative strategies of mutual 
funds after times of crisis. 
6 Managers of poorly and well-performing funds often face strong incentives to increase the riskiness of their funds as their 
salary and employment status depend on the development of the fund’s assets (e.g., Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996)). It is 
well documented that managers succeeding in fund tournaments and fund family tournaments attract more inflows from 
investors and support from the fund family (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Taylor (2003), Kempf and Ruenzi (2008), and 
Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele (2009)). 
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considered representative of the broader EU-wide regulation in this study; however, it is important to 
note that the implementation date and/or details of regulation in other EU-countries may differ. 
Funds might use derivatives for various reasons, e.g., to hedge interest rates, currency, or market 
risks; to substitute for a direct investment in the underlying position; or to increase returns. 
Regulators mainly limit a fund’s exposure to loss from its various operations. Concerning derivatives, 
excessive leverage, illiquidity (particularly with regard to complex, over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives), and large counterparty risk are of high importance to regulators.7 In this study, I present 
how the U.S. and German/EU regulatory frameworks measure and protect against the possible 
negative effects of leverage and derivatives. In order to determine the amount of flexibility regulation 
allows funds to have when designing their leverage and derivative strategies, I analyze two types of 
restrictions: those of general nature and those that are more issuer oriented. In the U.S. and 
Germany, the only direct form of leverage available to funds is bank borrowing. However, funds can 
implicitly create an effect similar to explicit borrowing (direct leverage) by investing in derivatives or 
engaging in securities-lending transactions8 (indirect leverage). For example, a fund can create 
implicit leverage the size of the notional amount9
The U.S. and German/EU regulatory frameworks differ in how they regulate the use of derivatives and 
leverage by funds. In the U.S., the amount a fund borrows from the bank is restricted to up to 33% of 
their net assets, while in Germany funds can only borrow up to 10% of their net assets. In addition to 
limits on direct leverage, U.S. and German regulation limits derivative use. In the U.S., funds, in 
general, are required to segregate or earmark portfolio securities as collateral for all potential 
obligations to a third party created by securities-lending transactions and derivatives, such as futures, 
forwards, written options, short CDS. Theoretically, under U.S. regulation, a fund could sell protection 
via CDS with a notional amount equal to its net asset value and earmark all its portfolio securities as 
collateral.
 by selling protection via CDS (short position), which 
is comparable to borrowing the notional amount from a bank and investing it in the principal of a 
bond. Funds that build high positions in derivatives can create extensive leverage, which could lead to 
liquidity problems and ultimately default. 
10
                                                          
7 See the SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 5, and the ICI Report on Derivatives (2008), p. 8-12. 
 In Germany/the EU, funds, in general, can use derivatives to at most double the potential 
market risk of a fund (as measured by the Value-at-Risk (VaR) determined at the 99% confidence 
level). Similarly, a fund might sell CDS protection with a notional amount equal to (or even higher 
8 E.g., if a fund enters into a repurchase agreement, it hands over some of its securities to the counterparty and receives 
cash instead, which is comparable to a collateralized loan.  
9 In case of derivatives, the notional amount usually reflects the scale of a position with reference to some underlying asset, 
and shows the volume traded during a period of time (McDonald (2009)). 
10 However, funds often segregate smaller amounts than originally required (only the daily mark to market liability) in the 
case of futures, forwards and interest rate swaps that require cash-settlement (SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011)). 
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than) its net assets as long as its VaR is less than twice as high as a VaR of a comparable fund without 
derivatives. Thus, by using derivatives, such as short CDS, a fund might create additional leverage and 
thereby circumvent the more stringent restrictions on direct leverage. However, if funds in worst case 
are required to pay the notional amount to the counterparty once a credit event specified under the 
CDS contract occurs, they might become illiquid due to extensive leverage. As a consequence of the 
flexibility provided by regulation, it is possible for funds in both countries to lose a large part of their 
value due to investments in derivatives, such as CDS, alone. This is exactly what happened to the 
Oppenheimer Champion Income Fund, which lost almost 80% of its value in 2008 primarily due to its 
CDS positions. This undesirable outcome suggests that it may be necessary to revise the regulation of 
derivatives in order to better protect mutual fund investors from potentially significant losses. 
Other rules, i.e., issuer-oriented rules, guarantee a fund’s independence from the credit risk of a few 
particular issuers by requiring it to diversify its portfolio. These rules limit a fund’s exposure to losses 
from the default of the issuers of securities, including derivative reference issuers (issuer risk) and 
counterparties (counterparty risk). In the U.S. and Germany, issuer-oriented rules limit the 
investment of mutual funds into the securities of one particular issuer by a certain amount of a fund’s 
net assets, e.g., up to 5%. However, the way the two countries account for exposure to the reference 
issuers of derivatives is different. Compared to Germany, U.S. funds are able to underestimate the 
exposure to particular issuers to a larger extent due to the application of the mark to market 
valuation.11
                                                          
11 According to the mark to market valuation, exchange-traded derivatives are valued at their market values, while for OTC 
derivatives such as CDS fair values are determined by fund boards. That is why I use market (fair) value notation for CDS in 
the following. 
 This difference is especially pronounced for the reference-issuer exposure gained from 
selling CDS protection to synthesize bonds, which is considered at the market (fair) value of the CDS 
in the U.S. (by contrast, it is considered at the market value of underlying position of the CDS (or 
notional amount) in Germany/the EU, which is in line with bond valuation under issuer-oriented 
rules). Thus, by selling protection via CDS written on high-risk positions, funds can influence their 
asset allocations and risk profiles to a large extent under U.S. regulation. In order to guarantee a 
fund’s independence from a few individual issuers and enhance investor protection, it is advisable 
that U.S. regulation accounts for the exposure to issuers more adequately than currently prescribed. 
Additional issuer-oriented rules guarantee that exposure to counterparty risk from derivative 
contracts (approximately measured by the positive market values of derivatives in both countries) 
does not exceed 5% of a fund’s assets in the absence of exchange trading or central clearing. 
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Furthermore, new global rules on mandatory central clearing for the majority of derivative 
transactions will further decrease potential counterparty risk.12
Overall, U.S. fund regulation is less strict regarding the use of direct leverage than German/EU 
regulation. A final conclusion about indirect leverage is difficult to make because rules are structured 
differently under both regulatory regimes. Nevertheless, funds in both countries can obtain 
derivatives with a notional amount higher than their net assets. Thus, depending on the type of 
derivatives used, a fund could reach the point at which default is theoretically possible due to its 
investments in derivatives alone. The analysis further reveals that, under existing issuer-oriented 
rules, funds in the U.S. are able to alter their asset allocations and risk profiles to a large extent using 
derivatives without being detected by the public and regulators. Thus, regulators in both countries 
should rethink whether the current level of flexibility is desirable from the perspective of investors 
(especially unsophisticated ones) and consider implementing some of the modifications proposed in 
the following text. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents regulation in the U.S. and Germany/EU 
regarding mutual fund leverage and derivative holdings and section 3 highlights the similarities and 
differences between the countries. Finally, section 4 concludes. 
2 U.S. and German/EU Regulation of the Use of Derivatives and Leverage by 
Mutual Funds 
Derivatives are generally defined as financial instruments whose value derives from the value of 
other underlying variables (Hull (2012)). The market value of derivatives is often zero at contract 
initiation or close to zero soon afterwards and the notional amount describes the contract size (and 
sometimes expresses the highest possible loss realizable for the derivative). The main characteristic 
of derivatives is that they generate leverage in the form of a bet on an underlying position that is 
much higher than the initial investment (premium), which amplifies the volatility of fund returns. 
Consequently, depending on the type of derivative used, the fund might incur significant losses. On 
the other hand, derivatives facilitate risk sharing among investors, improve price discovery and make 
the allocation of capital more efficient.13
                                                          
12 In 2009, the G-20 member states met in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania due to the aftermath of the financial crisis 2007-2009. 
This lead to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank-Act in 2010 in the U.S. and the European Market Infrastructure Regulation 
(EMIR) and Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) in Europe, which take effect in year 2013 and 2014, 
respectively. See “The Pittsburgh Summit: Key Accomplishments”, September 25, 2009, 
[
 However, according to Stulz (2010), the perception of 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ecosum/pitt sburgh2009/resources/165061.htm, visited on 05.12.2012]. 
13 The last sentences refer to McDonald (2009), p. 1-8, Stulz (2010), and the SEC Release 10666 (1979), p. 25129. Typically, if 
a fund holds a portfolio of bonds, it is exposed to the sum of the nominal values of those bonds. If the same fund invests its 
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derivatives as instruments that increase economic welfare declined after the financial crisis of 2007-
2009. In the following, I present the current regulation for several types of derivatives in the U.S. and 
Germany and analyze issues that might arise due to the use of CDS.  
2.1 Regulation of Investment Management Companies in the U.S. 
Investment management companies offer pools of securities and assets to investors, which allow 
them to diversify their portfolios and to acquire professional asset management by an investment 
adviser. In the U.S., these investment vehicles are registered with the SEC and fall under the 
provisions of the Investment Company Act (“ICA”) passed by the U.S. Congress in 1940.14 In general, 
regulation in the ICA is complemented by SEC Releases and the SEC staff responses to written 
requests of interested parties with respect to the application of the federal securities laws to 
proposed transactions (the latter are called “no-action” letters). The securities of investment 
management companies are subject to the standardized disclosure and reporting requirements of the 
federal securities laws (e.g., the ICA, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) rules, the 
Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) and their investment advisers are 
required to register with the SEC under the Advisers Act of 1940. Investment companies which 
register their securities offerings under the Securities Act of 1933 are generally allowed to offer and 
sell their securities to the broader public (including unsophisticated investors). Most of the 
investment companies also have a board of directors, a majority of whom are independent from the 
respective investment adviser and perform the role of independent “watchdogs” acting in the 
interest of investors.15
Although the ICA imposes only a few substantive limits on mutual fund investments, multiple 
operational restrictions exist to protect investors against conflicts of interest with the advisers 
(principal-agent problems). For instance, these important regulations specify the way to compute a 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
money primarily in derivatives that replicate securities, its exposure to bonds – measured by the sum of the notional 
amounts of the contracts – could be multiple times higher than if it were to invest in bonds directly (depending on the price 
of the derivatives compared to the price of regular bonds). This is comparable to, for example, directly borrowing money 
and investing it in the derivatives’ underlying positions. 
14 Section (sec.) 5(a)(1) of the ICA defines an “open-end company” as “a management company which offers for sale or has 
outstanding any redeemable security of which it is the issuer.” 
15 Also see the SEC Release 24083 (1999) regarding the responsibilities of the independent board members. Since 2007, only 
one independent member on the management board is required in Germany (§ 6a Investment Act/Investmentgesetz 
[2007]). 
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fund’s net asset value (section 2(a)(41) of the ICA), limit leverage, as well as detail certain trading 
strategies.16
- Senior securities limitations regarding leverage according to section 18, 
 Regarding leverage and derivatives, the following rules of the ICA are relevant:  
- Diversification provisions of sections 5(b)(1) and 13(a)(1) in conjunction with valuation based 
on sections 2(a)(36) and 2(a)(41), 
- Portfolio concentration rules of sections 8(b)(1)(E) and 13(a)(3), 
- Investing in securities-related issuers according to section 12(d)(3), 
- Accounting and financial statement reporting (section 30(e)) and applicable disclosure 
provisions of section 8(b) and items 4(a), 4(b), 9(b), 9(c), and 16(b) of Form N-1A (registration 
statement), 
- Other rules on the effect of derivative use on the liquidity of the fund’s portfolio, ICA 
regulations relating to custody (section 17(f)), and fund names (section 35(d)).17
Table 1 summarizes the most important provisions. 
 
Table 1: ICA provisions on derivative use and leverage by U.S. investment funds 
Issue  Content of the regulation 
1.) Senior Securities Limitations on Leverage (sec. 18(f) of the ICA) 
   
Controlling Leverage  Issuing any class of “senior security” is prohibited; 
however, mutual funds are allowed to borrow from banks 
if they maintain a 300%-asset coverage for those 
borrowings (thus, direct leverage is allowed up to 33.33% 
of a fund’s net assets). 
   
Controlling exposure to derivatives 
that create third party obligations 
(indebtedness), e.g., futures, forward 
contracts, written options (and 
securities-lending transactions, e.g., 
short sales)  
 Funds are allowed to engage in “senior security 
transactions” involving leverage like derivatives and 
securities-lending transactions only if they provide 
coverage (set aside assets or enter into offsetting 
positions) equal to at least the value of the potential 
obligations from these transactions. 
   
Derivatives not involving indebted-
ness, such as purchased stock call 
options and leveraged inverse floating 
rate bonds 
 Funds using derivatives that do not impose any payment 
obligations above the initial investment (i.e., premium) do 
not face leverage restrictions as these derivatives do not 
fall under sec. 18(f) of the ICA. 
 
   
                                                          
16 Information contained in this paragraph refers to the SEC Staff report (2003), p. 5-7, the SEC Staff report (1994), p. 27, and 
the SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 23 fn. 68. 
17 Information in this paragraph is based on the SEC Staff report (2003), p. 6-7. 
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Issue  Content of the regulation 
2.) Diversification Requirements (sec. 5(b)(1) and 13(a)(1) of the ICA) 
   
Controlling exposure to different 
issuers through derivatives becomes 
relevant if funds are classified as 
diversified according to sec. 5(b)(1) of 
the ICA 
 A diversified fund is not allowed to invest more than 5% of 
its value in the securities of any one issuer (and in no more 
than 10% of the outstanding voting securities of this 
issuer) for 75% of its asset value.  
   
3.) Portfolio Concentration Rule (sec. 8(b)(1)(E) and 13(a)(3) of the ICA ) 
   
Controlling exposure to different 
industries through derivatives 
becomes relevant if funds state that 
they are either concentrated in a 
particular industry (or group of 
industries) according to 8(b)(1)(E) of 
the ICA, or starting to concentrate 
through the use of derivatives 
 Concentration within an industry is assumed to take place 
whenever a fund invests more than 25% of its assets in an 
industry. To prevent funds from substantial changes of 
their nature and policies without shareholder approval, 
they have to state on the registration statement whether 
they concentrate investments in a particular industry or a 
group of industries. All investments must be considered. 
   
4.) Limitations on Investing in Securities-Related Issuers (sec. 12(d)(3) of the ICA) 
   
Controlling exposure to securities-
related issuers of derivatives 
 Funds are generally not allowed to purchase any security 
issued by (or acquire an interest in the business of) a 
broker, dealer, underwriter, or investment adviser 
(“securities-related issuer”). According to rule 12d3-1 of 
the ICA, funds are exempt from this prohibition under 
specific conditions, which allow them to invest up to 5% of 
the fund’s total assets in the securities issued by these 
issuers. 
      
 
2.1.1 General Leverage Restrictions in the U.S. 
Section 18(f) of the ICA is the most relevant piece of regulation regarding leverage. It prohibits mutual 
funds from issuing any class of “senior security” (leveraged capital structures) in order to avoid 
exploitation of senior bondholders and/or to limit the volatility of investments. Bonds, debentures, 
preferred stock, or bank loans are considered senior capital.18
                                                          
18 The last two sentences refer to the SEC Staff report (1994), p. 26-28. According to sec. 18(g) ICA, a “senior security” can be 
“any bond, debenture, note, or similar obligation or instrument constituting a security and evidencing indebtedness, and 
any stock of a class having priority over any other class as to the distribution of assets or payments of dividends; and ‘senior 
security representing indebtedness’ means any senior security other than stock.” Under the ICA, the definition of “security” 
includes any kind of “indebtedness”. See the SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 19 footnote (fn.) 57. 
 However, mutual funds are allowed to 
borrow from banks provided they maintain a 300 percent asset coverage for these borrowings (i.e., 
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direct leverage of up to 33.33% of a fund’s net assets is allowed).19
The use of derivatives increased in the 70s following the departure from the Bretton-Woods system 
(Hull (2012)). In 1979, the SEC stated in its Release 10666 that “leverage exists when an investor 
achieves the right to a return on a capital base that exceeds the investment which he has personally 
contributed to the entity or instrument achieving return.”
 The following additional rules 
apply to securities-lending and derivative transactions that cause potential obligations to a third party 
and, in principle, constitute prohibited “senior securities”. 
20 In the same release, the SEC required 
funds to cover the potential obligations to a third party for a number of transactions, such as reverse 
repurchase agreements, forward contracts, and written put contracts, in order to prevent these 
transactions from being construed as the prohibited “senior securities”. From then on, fund boards 
were required to detect the implicit leverage of other transactions that should be subject to this 
“coverage requirement”.21
Later, the SEC distinguished between derivatives that create potential obligations to a third party 
(indebtedness) and derivatives that create the economic equivalent of leverage (not by imposing any 
payment obligations above the initial investment, but rather providing a gain potential above the 
initial investment). Funds using derivatives that create indebtedness, e.g., future contracts or written 
options, are required to cover the potential obligations to a third party. By contrast, funds using 
derivatives that create the economic equivalent of leverage, e.g., purchased options that grant the 
right to unlimited gains while restricting losses to the amount of the initial investment, do not fall 
under the coverage regime.
  
22 Additionally, sec. 12(a) of the ICA regulates margin purchases and short 
sales, which can also increase leverage. This rule prohibits all margin purchases except for short-term 
credits necessary for clearing transactions and short sales. However, under sec. 18(f) of the ICA, the 
SEC agreed not to enforce the rule if a fund engaging in short selling provides sufficient coverage as 
required for derivatives.23
                                                          
19 Some limited private and temporary borrowings (up to 60 days and max. 5% of a fund’s value) are excluded from the 
definition. See sec. 18(g) ICA. ‘‘Asset coverage’’ of a senior security (representing the indebtedness of an issuer) refers to the 
ratio of the value of the total assets of the issuer minus all liabilities and indebtedness unrelated to senior securities to the 
aggregate amount of senior securities. See sec. 18(h) ICA.   
 In order to quantify the potential future obligations from long derivative 
positions, the SEC recommends using the purchase, or exercise price, of a contract (minus the margin 
20 SEC Release 10666 (1979), p. 25129 fn. 5.  
21 In its Release 7221 from 1972, the SEC mentioned, in the context of funds trading commodities, the requirement to cover 
for the first time. See Appendix A and the SEC Staff No-Action Letter to Dryfus (1987). 
22 A purchase of a call creates economic leverage where one can only lose the premium paid to purchase the call, but 
theoretically gain an infinite amount, whereas the sale of a call creates leverage in the sense of indebtedness to a third party 
because one can lose much more than the premium paid by the buyer (i.e., the difference between exercise price and 
market value of the underlying position). See the SEC Staff report (1994), p. 24-26. Similar reasoning applies for the 
purchase and sale of CDS protection, which can be seen as options on a company’s creditworthiness. 
23 See Appendix A, the SEC Staff No-Action Letter to Dryfus (1987), p. 2, and the SEC Staff No-Action Letter to RSIT (1995). 
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on deposit). For short positions (short selling), the SEC recommends using the market value of a 
security24 and the full amount of the reference asset (i.e., the notional amount) underlying the 
contracts (e.g., derivatives).25
Under U.S. regulation, funds using CDS are required to distinguish between contracts for buying 
(long) and selling (short) protection. Similar to derivatives that create the economic equivalent of 
leverage, buying protection against the default of a bond via CDS does not require a fund to follow 
the coverage rules mentioned above since it does not impose payment obligations above the initial 
investment (CDS spread).
 Appendix A shows the amount originally required to cover derivatives, 
including forwards, futures, options, swaps, and short selling.  
26
In order to comply with the coverage requirement, funds using derivatives that create indebtedness 
originally had to establish “segregated accounts” with a custodian (comparable to margin accounts) 
comprising sufficient levels of cash, U.S. government securities, or high-grade debt securities. 
Typically, securities segregated on the records of the custodian were unavailable for sale or other 
disposition (deemed frozen).
 When a fund sells default protection using CDS, however, it effectively 
adds leverage (indebtedness) to its portfolio, because it is exposed to the notional amount of the 
swaps beyond its total net assets. Hence, according to the SEC, in order to be exempt from the 
prohibition of issuing “senior securities”, a fund must cover the amount of potential future 
obligations, which would equal the notional amount. However, taking the CDS notional amounts as 
indicators for coverage is a conservative approach as it ignores the offsetting potential of the recovery 
values of CDS references. 
27
                                                          
24 Regarding short selling, a fund is required to maintain in “segregated accounts” an amount reaching the current market 
value of the security sold short (decreased by the amount of collateral deposited with the broker). See the SEC Staff No-
Action Letter to RSIT (1995), p. 3. Alternatively, the fund does not need to segregate assets if it covers selling a security short 
by owning that security or holding a call option on that security with a strike price less than the selling price of the security. 
See the SEC Staff No-Action Letter to Dryfus (1987), p. 2. 
 Since 1997, however, funds are no longer required to establish a 
25 The last two sentences refer to the SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 26. The SEC stresses that there are at 
least two ways to value a derivative: via the current market value, which reflects the price at which the derivative could be 
expected to be liquidated; and the notional amount, which reflects the contract size valued at current price. See the SEC 
Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 8-9. 
26 Buying CDS default protection is equivalent to shorting a bond that has an unknown future purchase price – unless a 
defined credit event occurs (e.g., the recovery value in case of default). If a defined credit event occurs, the fund gets the 
notional amount of the insured bond from the counterparty and provides the defaulted bond to the counterparty or, if a 
cash settlement was agreed upon, receives the net amount owed by the counterparty under the contract (minus any margin 
that must be posted under a standard ISDA contract). However, rules on short selling might be applicable if the two contract 
parties agree on a physical settlement, and require the fund to keep the underlying in its portfolio (as determining the 
amount of assets needed for coverage is difficult, because of the ex-ante unknown recovery value of the underlying). Please 
refer to the information contained in Appendix A. 
27 See the SEC Release 10666 (1979), p. 25131-25132 and the SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 22 fn. 65. In 
general, sec. 17(f) ICA requires investment companies to maintain their securities in the custody of a bank. Alternatively, 
they can maintain custody with a national securities exchange, securities depository, future commission merchants, 
commodity clearing organizations, and on their own books (self-custody). However, many derivatives by their nature require 
depositing collateral or margins to third parties to support the credit exposure to counterparty. See the CFRS Derivatives and 
Leverage Report (2010), p. 37-38. 
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segregated account with a custodian and can segregate assets themselves.28Beyond limiting a fund’s 
potential leverage, segregated accounts also serve as a source of payments for future obligations. 
Since 1987, underlying instruments of the relevant derivatives or other offsetting instruments are 
deemed suitable for coverage.29
Hence, potential third party obligations from derivatives and securities-lending transactions, as 
measured by the sum of the purchase/exercise price and notional amount of the derivative together 
with the current market value of securities “sold short”, might theoretically reach 100% of a fund’s 
total net asset value (TNA). However, the SEC observes that U.S. funds often use the market value of 
derivatives instead of the notional amount to measure the potential future obligations in case of 
swaps for “segregation”. Some funds also disclose that they segregate the daily mark to market 
liability when using futures or forwards that require cash-settlement.
 In 1996, the SEC extended the range of assets that could be 
segregated to any liquid asset, including equity securities and non-investment grade debt securities, 
given they are liquid and valued daily.  
30 This is likely due to the fact 
that in 1989, in connection with the review of fund registration statements, the SEC non-publicly 
acquiesced the segregation of the net amount due on the contract for interest rate swaps.31
A fund can hold all of its net assets as collateral in segregated accounts for selling CDS with a notional 
value equal to the net assets of a fund as long as no other type of derivatives is used. However, this 
approach ignores whether the fund uses these derivatives to implement non-speculative or 
speculative investment strategies. In consequence, a fund selling protection via CDS for non-
speculative purposes (e.g., to synthesize bonds) is treated as one pursuing speculative investment 
 Later in 
2005, the SEC (informally) indicated that a fund may segregate assets equal to the daily net amount 
owed under the contract for cash-settled futures and forwards (minus any margin that must be 
posted with a futures commission merchant). Today it is unclear whether funds segregate smaller 
amounts than originally required for all or only some types of derivatives and whether they do so in 
order to be more flexible in trading. Further research is needed on this issue. Nevertheless, U.S. funds 
might use this kind of “under segregation” to further increase their derivative holdings and eventually 
also indirect leverage without being detected by regulators. Overall, the SEC provides insufficient 
guidance for the application of the above derivative provisions.  
                                                          
28 The last two sentences refer to the SEC Staff No-Action Letter to MLAM (1996), the SEC Staff Letter from Lawrence A. 
Friend (1997), p.3, and the SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 25-26. In the following, coverage refers to either 
asset segregation or entering into offsetting positions by the fund. 
29 In the case of sold call options, this could be underlying securities (stocks) or offsetting positions, such as purchased call 
options. See Appendix A and the SEC Staff No-Action Letter to Dryfus (1987). Once transactions are covered, there is no 
reason to worry about undue leverage or speculation, which sec. 18 ICA protects against. See the SEC Release 10666 (1979), 
p. 25131-25132. 
30 The last two sentences refer to the SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 26. 
31 For further information, please refer to Appendix A, and the CFRS Derivatives and Leverage Report (2010), p. 14-18. 
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strategies (e.g., to capitalize on credit market timing). Non-speculative investment strategies would 
create (unlevered) bond positions by selling protection via CDS while simultaneously increasing the 
notional value of Treasury securities to the level of the CDS notional value in order to avoid higher 
costs that would eventually be incurred by buying bonds in the market (Oehmke and Zawadowski 
(2013)). By contrast, speculative investment strategies would in fact add leverage to its portfolio by 
selling CDS because it would be exposed to the notional amount of the swaps beyond its total net 
assets invested elsewhere. 
As an example, take two investment grade funds: one holding government bonds and the other only 
investing in asset-backed securities (ABS) (for simplicity, a residual cash position is ignored). If the first 
fund sells CDS on ABS with a notional amount equal to the fund’s TNA, it effectively generates ABS 
equal in value to a fund’s TNA. If the other fund, which is already invested in ABS, also sells CDS on 
ABS with a notional amount equal to the fund’s TNA, it will be subject to investment exposure on the 
notional amount of the swaps in addition to its total net assets. Under U.S. regulation, both funds 
would have to “segregate” all of their net assets to be able to pay their potential obligations. 
However, in the face of unexpected shocks, which might substantially decrease the value of the ABS, 
the fund originally investing in ABS would eventually be unable to meet all its financial obligations 
from short CDS on ABS. This is possible because the value of the segregated ABS quickly decreases 
(and hence, so does the fund’s current TNA) and some of the potential obligations out of the short 
CDS contracts, which are equal in value to the old level of TNA, become due. For the fund investing in 
government securities, the potential obligations out of the short CDS contracts, which are equal in 
value to the fund’s TNA (before the decrease in value of ABS is observable), also become due. 
However, the value of its segregated government securities will remain mostly unaffected (or even 
positively affected due to the “flight to liquidity” effect) by this shock and remain sufficiently high to 
cover the obligations. 
If the same funds were underestimating the amounts required for segregation by considering market 
values instead of notional amounts for CDS selling protection, it would allow them to increase 
indirect leverage even more and leave room for extensive risk-taking. Following the main idea of U.S. 
derivatives regulation, which restricts the level of potential obligations arising out of derivatives that 
incur an actual or contingent liability beyond their purchase price, it seems unreasonable to use 
market values that reflect expected values of future obligations at valuation date instead of using the 
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much higher notional amount for short CDS.32
Additionally, the U.S. general leverage restriction does not prevent funds from increasing the volatility 
of their returns by using derivatives that create the economic equivalent of leverage (derivatives that 
do not incur actual or contingent liability beyond the premium payment). This follows from the fact 
that the regulation focuses more on prohibiting funds from issuing senior securities rather than on 
limiting the volatility of investments.
 As observed during the financial crisis, prices and 
expectations at reporting date can change very quickly. 
33
Although disclosure rules will be discussed later in the text, the following quote from the Statement 
of Additional Information (SAI) of the PIMCO fund family exemplifies how funds handle their CDS 
exposure: “The Fund’s obligations under a credit default swap agreement will be accrued daily (offset 
against any amounts owing to the Fund). In connection with credit default swaps in which a Fund is 
the buyer or the seller, if the Fund covers its position through asset segregation, the Fund will 
segregate or ‘earmark’ cash or liquid assets with a value at least equal to the Fund’s exposure (any 
accrued but unpaid net amounts owed by the Fund to any counterparty), on a marked-to-market basis 
(when the Fund is the buyer), or the full notional amount of the swap (minus any amounts owed to 
the Fund) (when the Fund is the seller). Such segregation or ’earmarking’ seeks to ensure that the 
Fund has assets available to satisfy its obligations with respect to the transaction and could have the 
effect of limiting any potential leveraging of a Fund’s portfolio.”
 As long as derivatives are used for hedging purposes, the 
volatility of returns decreases. For example, funds might buy CDS to protect themselves against a 
bond’s default (or from counterparty’s default). By contrast, if such derivatives are used for 
speculative purposes, the volatility of returns increases although the fund does not incur actual or 
contingent liability beyond the premium. For instance, funds can buy protection via CDS on a large 
scale on bonds that are neither included in their portfolio, nor correlated with securities contained in 
their portfolio, as a kind of bet on the creditworthiness of the respective companies, thereby 
exposing investors to heightened risks. This might not be in the best interest of investors since a fund 
that extensively uses this kind of long CDS, i.e., keeps CDS notional values of the size of a fund’s assets 
(or higher), could lose a significant percentage of its portfolio value for premium payments if its bets 
are inaccurate.  
34
                                                          
32 For purposes of calculating TNA under the ICA’s valuation regulations, derivatives are generally valued using market value 
for exchange-traded derivatives and fair value for OTC derivatives; both reflect the value at which the derivative could be 
sold or transferred at the relevant time. This way the price at which fund shares are purchased/redeemed, is fair and does 
not result in dilution of investors’ share holdings. See the SEC Release 26299 (2003), p. 74718. 
 
33 See the CFRS Derivatives and Leverage Report (2010), p. 14-18. 
34 SAI of the PIMCO fund family (2013), p 42. 
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This implies that the leverage restriction, as well as the obligation to hold enough liquid assets to 
meet payment obligations and redemption requests immediately,35
Under the current leverage regulation, funds have a high amount of flexibility to use derivatives, 
which is exemplified by the possible use of CDS and indicative of potentially adverse consequences 
for investors. This flexibility stems from unspecific rules that have been partly relaxed over time, 
making the regulation nontransparent. However, various summary documents perceive the 
limitations on leverage differently. For example, the Investment Company Institute claims these 
limitations greatly minimize “the possibility that a fund’s liabilities will exceed the value of its 
assets.”
 guarantee that funds consider 
short CDS at notional amounts and long CDS at their negative market (fair) values. 
36 Regulators could significantly improve investor protection by revising the existing rules to 
measure derivatives exposure in a conservative way, i.e., by notional amounts and purchase/exercise 
prices (as originally suggested by the SEC), or by introducing clear and easy to enforce rules. If the 
goal is to protect unsophisticated investors from losing their entire investment due to a fund’s 
derivative holdings, the potential obligations from the speculative use of derivatives should be 
smaller than its TNA. For example, in Ireland, the maximum potential exposure from speculative use 
of derivatives is limited to 25% of TNA for non-UCITS investment companies offered to the public.37
Another approach could restrict the exposure from all derivatives on a notional basis as well as limit 
the notional amounts of derivatives used for speculation to a reasonable level (it is up to the 
regulator to decide what constitutes a reasonable level).
 
38
                                                          
35 See the SEC Release 10666 (1979), p. 25128, the SEC Staff report (1994) and the SEC Staff report (2003). 
 On the one side, the restriction on the 
notional amount of all derivatives could be equal to, e.g., a fund’s TNA, and still allow funds to benefit 
from the use of derivatives for non-speculative purposes. On the other side, the notional amounts of 
derivatives used for speculation could be limited to 50% of a fund’s TNA (or to the even more 
conservative level of 25%, as in the case of Ireland). This type of combined approach, together with 
the obligation to hold a sufficient amount of liquid assets in order to meet payment obligations and 
redemption requests at any time, could replace the necessity for coverage. Although the above 
combined approach (or another simple approximate) might imperfectly measure derivative exposure, 
it can still be effective for the purposes of regulation. Alternatively, one could limit the volatility of 
fund returns by prescribing funds to use sophisticated methods of risk calculation, such as the Value-
36 ICI Fact Book (2013), p. 221. 
37 See the SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 35. 
38 The exposure from selling CDS protection, together with the exposure generated by buying CDS protection on the 
notional basis, would be considered (if both are used for speculation) and limited to a reasonable level. Conceptually, this 
would be comparable to the commitment approach under German/EU regulation, which mainly focuses on the market 
values of the underlying positions of derivatives for funds that use (negligibly) complex derivatives or/and simple 
derivatives. 
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at-Risk (VaR) approach, which is currently applicable under German/EU regulation (CESR Guidelines 
(2010)). However, this might be difficult to implement and make comparisons across funds unreliable.  
2.1.2 The Treatment of Derivatives under Issuer-Oriented Rules in the U.S. 
As stated before, two kinds of exposure are important for the use of derivatives – exposure to the 
issuer of the underlying asset of the derivative (reference issuer risk) and to the issuer of the 
derivative itself (counterparty risk). These types of exposure are accounted for under various issuer-
oriented rules in the U.S., which restrict investments in the securities of one particular issuer to a 
certain percentage of a fund’s assets. The most important issuer-oriented rules are presented and 
discussed in the following subsections. 
2.1.2.1 ICA Diversification and Portfolio Concentration Rules and Derivatives 
According to section 5(b)(1) of the ICA, funds are obligated to “disclose in their registration statement 
whether they are classified as diversified or non-diversified.”39 Funds are also required to state 
whether they concentrate investments in a particular industry or in a group of industries in the 
registration statement (8(b)(1)(E) of the ICA).40
ICA Diversification Requirement and Derivatives 
 
A fund classified as diversified is not allowed to invest more than 5% of its TNA in the securities of 
one particular issuer (and keep more than 10% of the outstanding voting securities of this issuer) for 
75% of the value of its assets (5(b)(1) of the ICA). The diversification requirement guarantees a fund’s 
independence from a few issuers and protects against controlling portfolio companies (SEC Concept 
Release on Derivatives (2011)). A fund that does not meet the above described requirements is a 
non-diversified fund (5(b)(2) of the ICA). However, according to subchapter M regulation of the 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC), even a non-diversified fund is required to diversify 50% of its assets in a 
similar way; otherwise it would be subject to taxation on its income or capital gains at the entity level 
(ICI Fact Book (2013)). A diversified fund can become a non-diversified fund only after obtaining the 
approval of shareholders (13(a)(1) of the ICA).  
The relevant value of the total assets of a fund (2(a)(41) of the ICA) is determined at the end of its last 
proceeding fiscal quarter (including the value of the derivatives). Derivatives fall under the definition 
                                                          
39 SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 49. This is the U.S. analog to the German 5% issuer limit. 
40 See the SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 63. 
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of securities as “notes” or “evidence of indebtedness” (2(a)(36) of the ICA).41 The value of portfolio 
securities depends on the existence of market quotes and the securities belonging to the portfolio at 
the end of its last proceeding fiscal quarter (2(a)(41) of the ICA). If those two requirements are met, 
the value of the security is simply the market value at a particular point in time. If market quotes are 
unavailable, the value of the security or asset is equal to its fair value, as determined in good faith by 
the fund’s board of directors; for securities or assets purchased after the end of the fiscal quarter 
their costs are relevant (sec. 2(a)(41) of the ICA). However, it is unclear whether only the reference-
issuer exposure of the derivatives or if both the reference and counterparty exposure should be 
considered for the purposes of the diversification rule.42 Further, the SEC observes that the 
application of the mark to market valuation for derivatives could allow a fund to “maintain an 
ongoing exposure to a single issuer or group of issuers in excess of 5% of the fund’s assets on a 
notional basis, while continuing to classify itself as diversified.”43 Due to the fact that market values of 
derivatives do not reflect “the asset base on which future gains and losses will be based or otherwise 
represent the potential future exposure of the fund under the derivatives investment”44, the SEC 
questions whether the application of the notional value, instead of the liquidation value, would 
better fulfill the diversification requirements.45
Restricting the continuing exposure to a single issuer (or group of issuers) to below 5% of a fund’s 
assets on a notional basis would, in the case of short CDS, reduce a fund’s dependence on a few 
reference issuers more effectively than by limiting the market (fair) value of CDS. Moreover, the 
sources of leverage at the transaction level would be restricted. However, an even more precise 
approach for the diversification rule could require distinguishing between derivatives used for 
hedging and non-hedging purposes and limit those used for non-hedging purposes under the 
diversification rule, depending on the economic exposure created in combination with other 
securities. For example, hedging a portfolio against the default of a particular bond through buying 
default protection via CDS on the bond creates a risk-free security and thus, there is no need to 
account for the credit risk the fund faces with regard to this particular issuer (however, the 
 
                                                          
41 For an extensive discussion on this issue, please refer to the SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 49, fn. 134. 
42 See the SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 53. Under this rule, the counterparty exposure of a fund is 
eventually accounted for at the positive market value of the derivative. If a fund buys default protection via CDS on specific 
underlying positions from a bank, the positive market (fair) values of long CDS (minus margins provided by the counterparty 
under the standard ISDA agreements) reflects the current claims of the fund.  
43 SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 52. For example, a diversified fund may invest three percent of its assets in 
securities of an issuer and, additionally, sell CDS protection on this particular issuer with a notional equal to six percent of 
TNA. This would create an exposure equal to another six percent of the fund’s assets as measured by notional and yield a 
combined exposure to the issuer of nine percent of the fund’s total assets. Although the total exposure to this particular 
issuer is over five percent of total assets on a notional basis, one would observe a mark to market value of CDS that is lower 
than one percent of a fund’s TNA. This scenario is based on the SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 52, 29. 
44 SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 52. 
45 See the SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 53. 
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counterparty exposure also increases in parallel). Likewise, if a fund buys or sells default protection 
via CDS to offset existing positions in short or long CDS, it is no longer dependent on the reference 
issuers and thus, there is no additional risk. By contrast, selling default protection via CDS on a 
corporate issuer creates a synthetic bond position that exposes the fund directly to the reference 
issuer – similar to a regular bond. Under the current diversification rule, relying on the small market 
(fair) values of the CDS selling protection undervalues this exposure and allows funds to change their 
asset allocation and risk profile. For instance, investment grade funds could sell protection on risky 
issuers via CDS to a large extent without being detected by regulator or investors. As current rules 
restrict investments in securities of specific issuers by considering regular stocks and bonds at market 
values, using the market values of the underlying positions of derivatives when appropriate would be 
an even more precise approach, which is applied by funds in Germany/the EU.46
Portfolio Concentration Rule and Derivatives 
 
Focusing on one particular industry may be necessary with respect to the investment objective, but it 
can increase the riskiness of the fund due to a lower level of diversification as compared to funds that 
are more diversified. Concentration within an industry is assumed to take place whenever a fund 
invests more than 25% of its assets in one industry.47 Furthermore, funds are required to obtain 
shareholder approval before substantially changing their nature and policies (13(a)(3) of the ICA). 
Standard industry definitions are not provided in the U.S. and instead, funds determine the 
classifications for themselves (however, the economic characteristics of companies within each 
classification may not substantially differ).48
The wording of the concentration requirement does not encompass derivative transactions.
 
49
                                                          
46 The continuing exposure to a single issuer must also remain below 5% of TNA. Appendix C shows the commitment values 
for a selection of derivatives that need to be considered under German/EU issuer rules. Since the market (fair) value of the 
CDS reflects the difference between market value of the underlying position and the notional amount, the market value of 
the underlying position can be obtained by adding the market value of the CDS to the notional amount. 
 
However, entering into a derivative contract can generate exposure to many industries. For example, 
if a fund sells protection via CDS on a corporation from the durables industry (issuer of the reference 
asset), it gains exposure to the durables industry to the extent expressed in the market values of the 
CDS underlying positions (or alternatively in CDS notional amounts). By contrast, when buying CDS on 
durables from a bank (counterparty) the fund is exposed to the financial industry. Current claims of 
the fund would be reflected by positive market values of the CDS (while the highest potential claims 
would be reflected by the notional amount minus any collateral provided by the counterparty). Under 
47 See Instruction 4 Item 9 of Form N-1A, [http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-1a.pdf, visited on 29.03.2012], and the 
SEC Release 23064 (1998), p. 13927, nn. 98-99. 
48 See the SEC Schwab Amicus Brief (2010), p. 2-3, 7-8. 
49 See the SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 65-66. 
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this rule, derivatives can be considered at their market values or notional amounts; market values 
potentially underestimate a fund’s economic exposure to a particular industry through derivatives, 
whereas the notional amounts potentially overestimate the same exposure. Although it is important 
for funds to consider exposure to industries, they seem to do so only with regard to the reference 
issuers of derivatives (and not counterparties), and at market (and not notional) values50
In my view, the diversification and concentration rules serve similar purposes by guaranteeing 
diversification with regard to issuers (diversification rules) and industries (concentration rules). To 
prove compliance with these rules, one could focus on the reference-issuer exposure only. Existent 
rules such as the U.S. limit on investing in securities-related issuers and the global rules on mandatory 
central clearing are sufficient to capture the counterparty risk (these will be discussed in the next 
subsection).
 with similar 
consequences to what was described under the diversification rule. 
51
2.1.2.2 ICA Limitations on Investing in Securities-Related Issuers Through Derivatives 
 However, rules restricting investments in securities of specific issuers could better 
account for the reference-issuer exposure from derivatives by considering how derivatives are used in 
combination with other securities for non-hedging purposes, and relying on the market values of 
derivatives and the underlying positions of the derivatives (or alternatively, notional amounts). 
Otherwise, funds are able to circumvent the goal of both rules and change their asset allocations and 
risk profiles simply by selling CDS and relying on their small market (fair) values. 
Section 12(d)(3) of the ICA is important if a fund’s use of derivatives generates exposure to securities-
related issuers. Funds are generally not allowed to purchase any securities issued by (or acquire 
interest in a business of) any person who is a broker, dealer, underwriter, or investment adviser 
(“securities-related issuer”). The restrictions on the exposure to securities-related issuers should 
prohibit funds from risky investments in illiquid businesses of such issuers and, moreover, from 
exploitation by fund sponsors, who could otherwise take advantage of the funds they sponsor. This 
restriction applies to all investment companies irrespective of their diversification status and is also 
important when a fund purchases OTC derivatives (but not if derivatives are exchange-traded or 
                                                          
50 The last two sentences refer to the CFRS Derivatives and Leverage Report (2010), p. 29-30, and the SEC Concept Release 
on Derivatives (2011), p. 65-66. 
51 The Committees of Federal Regulation of Securities advocate including the market value of the derivative reference 
assets in the calculation and ignoring the counterparty because of the disclosure-based nature of the diversification and 
concentration requirement under the ICA. See the CFRS Derivatives and Leverage Report (2010), p. 29-30. 
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otherwise centrally cleared). Whenever a derivative counterparty is a securities-related issuer, the 
transaction might be equivalent to the acquisition of securities issued by (or interest in) this issuer.52
Under rule 12d3-1 of the ICA, if transactions are not considered to be acquisitions of interest in a 
securities-related issuer and the following conditions are met, funds can invest up to 5% of their total 
assets in the securities (valued at market values) of a securities-related issuer. Funds are allowed to 
purchase securities of (a) any securities-related issuer that earns 15% or less of its gross revenues 
from “securities-related activities”, provided that the fund does not control such person after 
acquisition. Alternatively, the securities-related issuer can (b) earn more than 15% of its gross 
revenues from “securities-related activities”, provided that after the acquisition of equity (debt) 
securities, the fund does not own more than 5% (10%) of the outstanding securities of that class of 
the issuer’s equity securities (of the outstanding principal amount of the issuer’s debt securities). 
Thus, the above exemption could be used by a fund that acquires OTC derivatives from a securities-
related issuer. In this situation, a derivative would be categorized as a debt security and subject to the 
above mentioned 10% debt limitation of rule 12d3-1 of the ICA under which funds are allowed to 
account for derivatives at their market values or notional amounts. However, the SEC observes that 
funds often, but not always, use notional amounts to perform these calculations.
 
53
However, the exemption would still prohibit transactions if a derivative is not a security issued by the 
counterparty, but instead perceived as a fund’s acquisition of “interest in” a securities-related issuer. 
How to discriminate between the two cases remains unclear; an analysis of the fund’s exposure to a 
reference asset underlying the derivative might be required.
 
54 In general, whenever there is 
dependency between the fund and the securities-related issuer of the reference asset of a derivative, 
especially when the securities-related issuer is a credit support provider, funds have to consider this 
relationship under rule 12(d)(3) of the ICA.55
                                                          
52 The information contained in this paragraph derives from the SEC Release 13725 (1984), the CFRS Derivatives and 
Leverage Report (2010), p. 29-33 and the SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 59, 62-63. 
 
53 Refer to the SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 58-60, 62-63. Under rule 12d3-1 ICA, all securities, except 
equities, are recognized as debt securities. See the SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 58 fn. 156. 
54 The CDS reference-issuer exposure from securities-related issuers would eventually have been accounted for under the 
diversification and portfolio concentration rules at the market (fair) values of the CDS (for which I recommend using the 
market values of the underlying positions for CDS selling protection, or for simplicity, the notional amounts, to compare 
them to the limits).  
55 See the CFRS Derivatives and Leverage Report (2010), p. 31, and the SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 59-61. 
In any case, it is not permitted to acquire a general partnership interest in a securities-related issuer by a fund. See the SEC 
Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 60. 
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All derivative counterparties are generally securities-related issuers.56 If derivatives are securities 
issued by a securities-related issuer (and not prohibited acquisitions of interest in their businesses), 
they are considered at their market values under the 5%-limit under rule 12d3-1 of the ICA, as for 
other securities. For example, whenever a fund buys protection via multiple non-centrally cleared 
CDS contracts written by a securities-related issuer, their notional amount would be used to check 
whether the exemptions of rule 12d3-1 of the ICA are fulfilled (i.e., if a fund’s notional of all debt 
securities including CDS lies below 10% of the outstanding principal amount of the securities-related 
issuer’s debt securities). Alternatively, the market (fair) value of the CDS could be used to check 
compliance with this condition. If this condition is met, the fund might invest 5% of its assets in CDS 
(and other securities) of a particular securities-related issuer and, as required under current 
regulation, value these securities at their market values. When using the market values of derivatives 
to test whether debt securities of a particular issuer (including CDS) lie below 10%, the potential 
exposure to counterparties on a notional basis may, in fact, be multiple times higher than suggested 
by the market values.57 This may create a problem if economic conditions change quickly (e.g., as 
happened during the financial crisis of 2007-2009). As long as all funds are required to make the first 
stage test for debt securities on a notional basis, comparing the market (fair) values of CDS to the 5% 
limit as currently prescribed by law would be sufficient to prevent funds from suffering significant 
losses due to counterparty failure.58
Recent Developments in U.S. Regulation on Restricting Counterparty Exposure 
 In addition, the new rules implemented by the global community 
in the near future will further limit counterparty exposure from derivatives.  
At the Pittsburgh G-20 Summit held in Pennsylvania on September 24-26, 2009, leaders agreed that 
all standardized OTC derivative contracts should be required to be cleared by a central counterparty 
(CCP) and reported to trade repositories by the end of 2012. As a consequence, most derivatives will 
be traded on swap execution facilities (SEFs) or exchanges and cleared by clearinghouses. The U.S. 
implemented the relevant regulatory framework for OTC derivatives in Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act 
(2010), known as the Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010. The Act authorizes the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to regulate “swaps”, the SEC to regulate “security-
based swaps”, and both the CFTC and SEC to regulate the fill-in category of “mixed swaps” capturing 
                                                          
56 See the CFRS Derivatives and Leverage Report (2010), p. 33. In the CFRS Derivatives and Leverage Report (2010), it is 
further recommended to disregard a fund’s counterparty exposure from derivatives if payments due to the fund are fully 
protected by collateral (if the latter is bankruptcy-protected). 
57 See the SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 29, 53. Neither the SEC nor its staff has addressed that the 
exposure of the fund to its counterparty or the issuer of a reference name may be understated under the calculation if the 
current market value of the derivative is the appropriate measure (the potential future exposure of the fund to a securities-
related issuer is also likely to be unaccounted for by the mark to market standard). See the SEC Concept Release on 
Derivatives (2011), p. 62. 
58 This would be in line with the findings of Helwege and Zhang (2013) – counterparty exposures are small, especially among 
banks that face diversification regulations (comparable to mutual funds), and do not typically cause a cascade of failures. 
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both swaps and security-based swaps. The term “swap” incorporates various derivatives: interest rate 
swaps, foreign exchange (FX) transactions (excluding forward FX)59, commodity swaps, and certain 
credit swaps (excluding security-based swaps). A “security-based swap” is a swap referenced on a 
single security or loan, including CDS written on single issuers (e.g., a company or government), or a 
small group of securities/narrowly defined index (with fewer than 9 components). Since the 
implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, both regulatory authorities have designed new rules for 
“cleared” swaps and higher capital requirements for “uncleared” swaps. External business conduct 
standards impose higher due diligence obligations on swap dealers/major swap participants and also 
require end-users to provide extended documentation.60
Central clearing, which was introduced in the U.S. in March 2013, is expected to minimize the impact 
of a counterparty’s default as all contract counterparties are required to post collateral (initial and 
variation margin) with the CCPs, irrespective of their credit worthiness. In addition, CCPs themselves 
face stronger capital requirements. At the moment, central clearing is required with regard to interest 
rate swaps and specific CDS on indices. According to Duffie and Zhu (2011), it is unclear whether or 
not the expected benefits of the central clearing of derivatives, i.e., substantial reductions in 
counterparty risk, will be lost due to the fragmentation of clearing services. In addition, the amount 
of clearable CDS exposures is uncertain. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) only recently developed consistent 
global standards on margin requirements for non-centrally cleared swaps as a basis for the rules of 
the G-20 member states. These standards are expected to reduce global contagion and spillover 
effects by guaranteeing that sufficient collateral is provided to offset losses caused by the default of a 
(derivative’s) counterparty. All financial firms and systemically important non-financial entities 
(“covered entities”) that use uncleared derivatives must exchange the initial margin (reflecting the 
potential future exposure) and variation margin (expressing current exposure) equivalent to the 
counterparty risks posed by such transactions. Additionally, only collateral that is high-quality and 
liquid can be provided to meet the above requirements (BCBS & IOSCO (2013)).
 
61
                                                          
59 The Secretary of the Treasury excludes forward FX transactions involving the physical exchange of a single currency for 
another (e.g., EUR for USD) from regulation as “swaps”. See the SEC & CFTC Release 33-9338 (2012). 
 
60 For more information and sources, please refer to the “Dodd-Frank Act Rulemaking: Derivatives” 
[http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml, visited on 15.12.2012], the SEC Release 34-68071 (2012), the 
CFTC Rule (17.02.2012), the CFTC Rule (11.09.2012), the SEC Roadmap (2012) and the final rule SEC & CFTC Release 33-9338 
(2012). The Dodd-Frank Act (2010) prohibits the regulation of swaps under insurance laws. 
61 Information in this paragraph refers to “Final Margin Framework for Uncleared Derivatives Released by Basel Committee 
and IOSCO Board Excludes Nonfinancial End-users from Requirements to Post Margin”, November 11, 2013, 
[http://www.velaw.com/resources/FinalMarginFrameworkUnclearedDerivativesBaselCommitteeIOSCOBoard.aspx, visited 
on 20.12.2013] and BCBS & IOSCO (2013). 
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2.1.2.3 Derivatives and Other Relevant Rules on a Fund’s Liquidity, Name, and Disclosure 
Illiquid assets 
Funds are required to keep at least 85% of their assets in liquid securities. Therefore, they have to 
adequately account for derivatives when verifying that less than 15% of their net assets are invested 
in illiquid assets, i.e., securities that cannot be disposed of within seven days under usual business 
conditions at approximately the amount at which the fund values them. The SEC liquidity 
requirements of derivative instruments are dependent on relevant market conditions. Custom-made 
derivatives are more likely to be illiquid. The valuation of derivatives is typically carried out at market 
or fair values; at the same time, there is no clear distinction between different degrees of liquidity 
given by the law. Consequently, many funds incorporate clauses into their contracts that guarantee 
seven-day termination rights in their favor.62 Due to the short-term orientation, using the market 
values of derivatives can be justified under this rule.63
Fund Name Regulation 
 
Rule 35(d) of the ICA prohibits funds from using names that are deceptive and misleading. When 
determining their name, funds have to take into account investor perceptions and manage their 
assets accordingly. If a name suggests that the fund invests in a particular type of security, then at 
least 80% of the assets have to be invested in positions that comply with the name (fund name 
regulation in the following). Under this rule, securities including derivatives are considered at their 
market values. The CFRS Derivatives and Leverage Report (2010) recommends that the reference 
asset of a derivative is considered as an indicator of a fund’s investment focus and the market values 
of derivatives used to prove compliance with rule 35d-1 of the ICA. Up to 20% of the assets can be 
held in other investments, i.e., cash or cash equivalents that are suitable to meet redemption 
requests. Descriptions like “short-term”, “intermediate”, and “long-term” are consistent with the fund 
name when the fund portfolio has a dollar-weighted average maturity of: at most 3 years (short-
term); more than 3 years, but less than 10 years (intermediate); and more than 10 years (long-term). 
The 80% rule does not apply to fund names that contain the terms “growth” and ”value” since they 
indicate the investment strategy as opposed to the type of investments.64
                                                          
62 For more details, see the SEC Staff report (1994), p. 20-22, the CFRS Derivatives and Leverage Report (2010), p. 36-37, and 
Form N-1A [
 Shareholders must be 
notified about every change in investment policy 60 days prior to the change. 
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-1a.pdf, visited on 29.03.2012]. 
63 However, as mentioned in the introduction, experience from the financial crisis 2007-2009 has shown that quickly 
increasing obligations from CDS holdings can cause the illiquidity of many market participants. 
64 For more detailed information about fund name regulation, please refer to 35(d) ICA in connection with the SEC Release 
24828 (2001). Fulfilling the 80% requirement does not automatically mean that the name cannot be materially deceptive 
and misleading. See the SEC Release 24828 (2001). 
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Disclosure 
U.S. funds are required to inform investors about their investment objectives and policies, investment 
strategies, and risks in statements of incorporation (Form N-1A), prospectuses, Statements of 
Additional Information (SAIs), and periodic reports. The statement of incorporation contains 
information about a fund’s intention to use derivatives, while the prospectus comprises information 
about a fund’s current use of derivatives and/or its intention to use derivatives. The SAI includes 
detailed descriptions of a fund’s (or a fund family’s) derivative handling, while the report comments 
describe the derivative strategies applied by a fund together with a brief overview of derivative 
handling. New FASB rules regarding financial information related to credit derivatives, which were 
introduced over the course of 2009, create uniformity in report comments, thereby allowing for 
better fund-to-fund comparisons. Funds are now required to state the nature and the terms of credit 
derivatives, give reasons for entering into those instruments, specify events that require the seller to 
perform under a contract, and describe the current status of the payment/performance risk with 
regard to the contract. Moreover, funds have to post information about the highest potential amount 
that the fund could be required to make as a contract seller, the market (or fair) value of the contract, 
and the nature of any recourse provisions/assets held either as collateral or by third parties. Before 
this change, information concerning derivatives was arranged arbitrarily throughout the financial 
statements of funds, causing large variation in the details provided about derivatives contracts.65
2.2 Regulation of Mutual Funds in Germany 
  
The following presents an overview of mutual fund regulation for UCITS-compliant funds (“UCITS 
funds”)66
2.2.1 The Transition from the Investment Act (2004) to the Capital Investment Law (2013) 
, with a focus on investment strategies, the use of derivatives and leverage, legal disclosure 
requirements, as well as recent changes. 
In 2004, the German mutual fund industry was at a juncture marked by the legal endorsement of 
hedge funds and a major extension of the scope of possible investment strategies pursued by other 
types of mutual funds, including the wide use of derivative instruments as a part of the investment 
strategy. Moreover, new regulation introduced a simplified prospectus, specific expense disclosure 
                                                          
65 Information contained in this paragraph refers to the ICA (1940), sec. 8(b), 30(e), the Securities Act (1993), the SEC Letter 
to the GCotICI (2010), the CFRS Derivatives and Leverage Report (2010), p. 41, and FASB ASC 815-10 (2009), Form N-SAR 
[http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-sar.pdf, visited on 20.12.2013]. 
66 However, the term “UCITS” commonly refers to “the investment company (if the UCITS is self-managed), and the 
management company, if the UCITS is not self-managed, or if the UCITS is set up in a contractual or unit trust form.” CESR 
Guidelines (2010), p. 4. 
 23 
 
rules, and tax-neutral mergers of mutual funds. The liberalization of the European mutual fund 
industry was driven by an adaptation of the overhauled European UCITS directive 85/611/EEC67
In order to promote the competitiveness of Germany as an investment location, the Investment 
Modernization Act came into effect on January 1, 2004. The Act consisted of two parts, the 
supervisory Investment Act (“IA”)/Investmentgesetz (“InvG”) and the Investment Tax Act 
(“ITA”)/Investmentsteuergesetz (“InvStG”). It replaced the old regulation of the German Capital 
Investment Companies Act (“GCICA”)/Gesetz für Kapitalanlagegesellschaften (“KAGG”) from 1957 and 
the Foreign Investment Funds Act (“FIFA”)/Auslandinvestmentgesetz (“AIG”), which were the relevant 
regulations for German and foreign mutual funds in Germany, respectively. In the period from 2004 
to mid-2011, the IA/InvG underwent two major reforms before it was finally replaced by the Capital 
Investment Law (CIL)/Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch (KAGB) in 2013. Appendix B provides an overview of 
the major changes and lists the statutory orders, which further specify the content of the legal 
changes, used for the discussion of financial derivatives regulation later in this document. 
 on 
the national level by member states in the years following 2001. 
The Investment Amendment Act (“IAA”)/Investmentänderungsgesetz (“InvÄndG”) and the UCITS-IV-
Implementation-Act (“UCITS-IV-IA”)/OGAW-IV-Umsetzungsgesetz (“OGAW-IV-UmsG”) came into 
effect on December 28, 2007 and July 1, 2011, respectively.68 The focus of the IAA/InvÄndG was on 
the further deregulation, extension of scope (e.g., PPP or microfinance investment funds, among 
other investment funds), and the elimination of competitive disadvantages of open-end real estate 
funds. The UCITS-IV/OGAW-IV reform was concerned with the implementation of a powerful set of 
regulatory and supervisory conditions in order to let investment companies and single investors 
benefit equally from the advantages of a common market. The benefits of the reform included the 
simplification of cross-border notification procedures (and the introduction of a complete EU-
Passport69
                                                          
67 Council Directive 85/611/EEC of 20 December 1985 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS), OJ L 375, 31.12.1985, p. 3-18. The 
directive had undergone substantial changes from two amending directives by this time. The previous sentences in this 
paragraph refer to the BVI Jahresbericht 2004, S. 41, and Vollbrecht (2003), p. 1-2. 
), mergers, and the pooling of financial assets through the introduction of master-feeder 
structures. Especially noteworthy was the EU-wide harmonization of regulations concerning the 
68 The end of 2007 amendment was a full implementation of the consolidated UCITS Directive (85/611/EEC)/OGAW-
Richtlinie (RL) (85/611/EWG) and the Implementing Directive (2007/16/EC)/Durchführungs-RL (2007/16/EG), whereas by 
the mid-2011 amendment the UCITS Directive (2009/65/EC)/OGAW-RL (2009/65/EG) was implemented. 
69 The extension of the EU-Passport to a complete EU-Passport for management companies enables managers to manage 
mutual funds located outside their country of residence in the EU. 
 24 
 
supervision of management companies and investment funds and mutual recognition by the relevant 
member state authorities.70
On the EU level, the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (“EMIR”) and the Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers Directive (“AIFMD”) entered into force on August 16, 2012 and July 21, 
2011, respectively, but have not yet been fully implemented.
 
71
2.2.2 Restrictions on the General Investment, Leverage, and Issuer-Oriented Investments 
of Funds in Germany 
 The European Securities and Markets 
Authority (“ESMA”) is responsible for the consistent application of EU legislation in all member states 
and plays a special role in the implementation of the new OTC derivatives rules. ESMA is responsible 
for the authorization and monitoring of CCPs and trade repositories. Although central clearing 
specifically addresses counterparty credit risk, not all OTC derivative contracts are considered suitable 
for mandatory CCP clearing. For this reason, the rules further require ESMA to establish, maintain, 
and keep an updated public register on their website. The AIFMD fulfills the G-20 commitments with 
regard to a wide range of (alternative) investment funds that were not regulated at European level by 
the UCITS Directive 2009/65/EC. In addition to hedge and private equity funds, real estate funds and 
various types of institutional funds comprise alternative investment funds (“AIFs”). After 
implementing AIFMD into national law, all investment funds in the EU will be categorized either as 
UCITS or AIFs. In Germany, both the rules of the UCITS Directive 2009/65/EC and the AIFMD are 
combined into a new Capital Investment Law (CIL)/Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch (KAGB), which came into 
force on July 22, 2013. Since all important German statutory orders, legal interpretations, and tax 
rules still refer to the old IA/InvG, I will sometimes refer to the IA/InvG. Appendix D translates the 
relevant laws of the old IA/InvG to the new CIL/KAGB. 
The legal definitions of mutual fund types, which were valid until 2003, were subsumed under the 
umbrella term of investment fund (“Sondervermögen”), which continues to exist under prevalent 
regulation. According to § 2 IA/InvG [2004], investment funds are defined as open-end investment 
funds (“Publikums-Sondervermögen”) managed by an investment management company and must 
adhere to the standards of the UCITS directive (85/611/EEC). Although UCITS-compliant funds are the 
most common type of mutual fund, other special investment funds are also available to the public 
and subsumed under the term AIF since mid-2013. 
                                                          
70 Regarding information contained in this paragraph, please refer to the Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des 
Finanzausschusses, Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 16/6874 vom 25.10.2007, p. 230, UCITS-IV-Implementation-
Act/OGAW-IV-Umsetzungsgesetz (Entwurf vom 31.12.2010), p. 1, 85, and the BVI Jahresbericht 2008, p. 50. 
71 To the information contained in this paragraph, see EMIR (2012) and AIFMD (2011). 
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In order to use the legal mutual fund category for naming and marketing purposes, the law requires 
mutual funds to invest at least 51% of their assets in the respective category. Under this rule, 
securities including derivatives are considered at their market values. For example, a UCITS fund that 
is primarily (at least 51%) invested in fixed-rate securities should use the term “Bonds” or “Renten”, 
while a fund that is primarily invested in shares should use the term “Equity” or “Aktien”.72
Since 2004, UCITS funds have been able to invest in an extended set of assets: securities (§ 193 
CIL/KAGB), money market instruments (§ 194 CIL/KAGB), bank deposits (§ 195 CIL/KAGB), investment 
fund shares (§ 196 CIL/KAGB), derivatives (§ 197 CIL/KAGB), and other investment vehicles (§ 198 
CIL/KAGB). The acquisition of precious metals or certificates for precious metals are explicitly 
prohibited by § 192 of the CIL/KAGB. Moreover, regulations concerning borrowing (§ 199 CIL/KAGB), 
securities borrowing and collateral (§ 200 CIL/KAGB), repurchase agreements (§ 203 CIL/KAGB), and 
short sales (§ 205 CIL/KAGB) have to be obeyed. Of high importance are also the legal issuer and 
investment limits (§§ 206–211 CIL/KAGB), which serve the purpose of reducing credit and market 
risk. A selection is summarized in Table 2. 
  
Table 2: Issuer and investment limits for UCITS funds 
 § CIL/KAGB Issuer and Investment Limits (§§ 206–211 CIL/KAGB) % of fund assets 
      
§ 206 (1)    Securities and money market instruments of the same 
issuer (borrower) 
 5%/10% (40% 
cumulatively)  
     
§ 206 (5)  Securities, money market instruments, bank deposits, and 
the offset amount for counterparty credit risk from OTC 
derivatives of the same institution 
 20% cumulatively  
     
§ 206 (4)   Bank deposits with one bank  20% 
     
§ 199  Short-term loans (< 1 year)  10% 
     
§ 205  Prohibition of short sales has to be obeyed for all 
investment strategies. Since July 1, 2011, this is no longer 
applicable to derivatives. 
  
     
§ 210  The sum of the notional amounts of bonds and money 
market instruments of the same issuer must not exceed 
10% of the total notional amounts of bonds and money 
market instruments issued by this issuer. 
 10% of the issuer’s 
o/s total notional 
amounts 
     
                                                          
72 See the BaFin Directive on Fund Categories/BaFin-Richtlinie zur Festlegung von Fondskategorien (2004) & (2011). 
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 § CIL/KAGB Issuer and Investment Limits (§§ 206–211 CIL/KAGB) % of fund assets 
      
§ 210  Voting/Non-voting shares of the same issuer may be 
purchased for a UCITS fund only insofar as their share in 
the total amount of voting/non-voting shares of the same 
issuer does not exceed 10%.  
 10% of an issuer’s o/s 
voting or non-voting 
stock 
     
§ 197  Derivatives can be included up to a two times increase of 
a fund's potential market risk. Associated issuer and 
counterparty risks have to be incorporated into the 
calculation of the above issuer limits. 
 Max. doubling of a 
fund's potential 
market risk 
          
Paragraphs 206-211 of the CIL/KAGB establish a ceiling on the amount mutual funds are permitted to 
invest in certain asset types. In general, the law aims at distributing risk among a broad basis of 
issuers, securities, and real estate. According to § 206 (1) CIL/KAGB, no more than 5% of a fund’s 
assets may be invested in securities and money market instruments of the same issuer. This issuer 
limit may be elevated to 10% of the asset value of a UCITS fund only if it is explicitly stated in the 
terms of the contract and the sum of such exceptions does not exceed 40% of the fund’s value 
(5%/10%/40%-issuer rule). Furthermore, § 206 (4) CIL/KAGB imposes another volume restriction on 
investments in bank deposits with the same credit institute, which may not exceed 20% of the UCITS 
fund assets. Prior to 2004, sufficient deposit insurance did not warrant such a restriction. Since 2004, 
the offset amount for counterparty credit risk from OTC derivatives of the same institution is limited 
to no more than 5% of a fund’s assets or 10% in the case of credit institutions.73
Short-term borrowing is limited to 10% of a fund’s assets if provided for in the terms of the contract 
and if the credit terms are in line with common practices (§ 199 CIL/KAGB). Short-term loans have a 
maturity equal to or less than 1 year and serve either for investment purposes or to bridge a liquidity 
gap, but should not be part of long-term investment strategies.
 A fund’s cumulative 
investment in securities, money market instruments, bank deposits, together with the offset amount 
for counterparty credit risk of the same institution, are restricted to a maximum of 20% of a fund’s 
assets (§ 206 (5) CIL/KAGB), with the aforementioned issuer-related ceilings remaining in place. 
74 Moreover, short sales are prohibited 
by § 205 CIL/KAGB (derivatives are excluded from this prohibition since mid-2011). The use of 
derivatives may, at most, double the potential market risk of a mutual fund (§ 197 CIL/KAGB) – i.e., 
the potential market risk from derivatives must be lower than a fund’s TNA.75
                                                          
73 See § 22 Derivative Order/DerivateV (2004), § 22 Derivative Order/DerivateV (2011) and the CESR Guidelines (2010). 
 Investment companies 
74 See the BaFin-Questions on Leverage/BaFin-Fragenkatalog zur Kreditaufnahme (2009). 
75 Under the commitment approach (simplified method), one can increase the potential market risk of a fund by using 
derivatives by 100% of its TNA, i.e., increase leverage to 200% (§ 51 (2) IA/InvG [2004]). See Vollbrecht (2003), p. 4. 
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have to assess their potential market risk by using an appropriate risk model and check it at least on a 
daily basis (CESR Guidelines (2010)). Since 2004, funds are allowed to use either the commitment 
approach (simplified method) or the VaR approach (advanced method) for risk measurement, 
depending on the types of derivatives used. The CESR Guidelines (2010) clarify that the commitment 
approach relates to the incremental exposure/leverage, whereas the VaR approach concentrates 
primarily on market risk.76
Since 2004, generally all kinds of derivative instruments may be purchased, including credit 
derivatives (§ 51 (1) IA/InvG [2004]). Furthermore, these derivatives may be used for hedging and 
investment purposes to a much larger extent than before.
 Issuer and counterparty risks associated with derivatives have to be 
incorporated into the aforementioned calculations of issuer limits and will be discussed later in the 
text. 
77
Under the new regulation, restrictions are placed on permissible underlying assets; hence, derivatives 
might be based on the following underlying positions: securities, some investment fund shares, 
 Prior to 2004, a legal catalogue existed 
for all legally permitted derivatives. In Germany, securities funds („Wertpapier-Sondervermögen“) 
were initially (starting in 1990) allowed to use derivatives – particularly options and futures based on 
equity indices, interest rates, or currencies. Funds were allowed to sell futures contracts for hedging 
purposes (if they keep the referenced underlying positions in their portfolios or if they, in the case of 
futures on currencies, face equal underlying risks in their portfolio). Until 1998, the exercise prices of 
purchased or sold options and the value of futures contracts could each reach up to 20% of a fund’s 
TNA (however, funds could purchase interest rate futures contracts for non-hedging purposes if they 
complied with the 20% of TNA limit on the value of all futures contracts). From 1998 to 2004, funds in 
Germany could use options, futures/forwards, options on futures (based on securities, accepted 
indices, interest rates or currencies) and swaps (total return swaps, currency and interest rate swaps). 
Funds that held swaps were required to hold the respective underlying positions in their portfolios, 
which was otherwise only required if funds were selling derivatives or their underlying positions (for 
any purposes). Funds buying or selling currency futures (or options on them) could do so only if they 
hedged the risks existing in their portfolios. Until 2004, the market value of a fund’s securities 
including futures contracts (of contracts selling the underlying for non-hedging purposes and those 
buying the underlying) could be, at most, equal to their net assets. 
                                                          
76 For details regarding the application of the simplified and advanced method provided also later in the text, please refer to 
the following BaFin Explanation (2009) on the Derivative Order (2004)/BaFin-Erläuterung (2009) zu den §§ 6 – 17 DerivateV 
(2004) and BaFin Explanation (2011) on the Derivative Order (2011)/BaFin-Erläuterung (2011) zu den §§ 6 – 17c DerivateV 
(2011), respectively. 
77 2004 was the first year were pure derivative funds could be launched in Germany. See the BVI Jahresbericht 2004, p. 43-
44. To the following sentences of this paragraph compare §§ 8d-8f GCICA/KAGG [1990] and §§ 8d-8f GCICA/KAGG [1998]. 
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money market instruments, accredited financial indexes, interest and exchange rates (or currencies). 
The use of derivatives is regulated under § 197 CIL/KAGB in conjunction with the Derivative Order 
(2004)/DerivateV (2004) and Derivative Order (2011)/DerivateV (2011), with the latter referring to 
the old § 51 IA/InvG. Since 2004, the use of derivatives must not lead to an alteration of a fund’s 
purpose, as stated in the prospectus and the terms of contract. Moreover, it must be attuned to the 
profile of a typical fund investor and obey the above investment regulations and contract terms.78
2.2.2.1 Derivative Use under the General Restriction of the Commitment Approach  
 
The commitment approach is suited for funds that use simple derivatives, but it might also be used if 
the amount of complex derivatives in their portfolios is negligible (which is assumed whenever the 
highest potential loss arising out of these derivatives lies below 1% of a fund’s TNA). The commitment 
approach is mainly focused on market values of the underlying positions of derivatives. Under this 
method, all derivatives are transformed into the value of their underlying positions and, unless 
categorized as a hedging instrument or part of another non-speculative strategy (and netted out),79
Since 2004, funds applying the commitment approach are only allowed to use long single-name CDS 
for “hedging” purposes as defined by CESR Guidelines (2010). If funds use complex derivatives like 
short single-name CDS or multi-name CDS, they are, in general, required to use the more advanced 
VaR approaches for risk measurement because complex correlations are not adequately accounted 
for under the commitment approach. Nevertheless, even if funds use complex derivatives to a 
negligible extent, they still have to adequately specify the commitment values for these derivatives 
under the commitment approach (CESR Guidelines (2010)). 
 
their sum is compared to a fund’s TNA. Appendix C contains selected items from the list of examples 
for calculating the commitment values of various derivatives, which are provided in the CESR 
Guidelines (2010). 
As stated before, only the commitment values from the speculative use of derivatives are compared 
to a fund’s TNA. For CDS bought on single-name underlying positions, the commitment values equal 
the market values of the underlying reference assets, whereas for the CDS sold on single-name 
underlying positions, the larger of either the market values of the underlying reference assets or the 
                                                          
78 The regulation presented in the main text is based on the BaFin Explanation (2009) on the Derivative Order (2004)/BaFin-
Erläuterung (2009) zu DerivateV (2004), which took effect on January 1, 2009 and was renewed in the middle of 2011 (BaFin 
Explanation (2011) on the Derivative Order (2011)/BaFin-Erläuterung (2011) zu DerivateV (2011)). 
79 Irrespective of whether two derivatives, or a derivative in combination with a non-derivative security, are considered, 
netting requires the underlying positions to be the same, e.g., exactly the same bonds of an issuer. By contrast, “hedging” as 
defined by the CESR Guidelines (2010), allows for different references. Both netting and hedging require that no additional 
gains are simultaneously generated and the risk of a fund is reduced and the market risks of derivatives are offset. 
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notional amounts of the CDS are used as the commitment values. The commitment values of long 
CDS will not be considered for comparison with a fund’s TNA if a fund is offsetting another position 
(with an underlying having the same notional amount, coupon, and maturity) or buying protection on 
a bond already included in the fund’s portfolio (for “hedging” purposes as defined by CESR Guidelines 
(2010)). By contrast, the commitment values of long and short CDS used for speculative purposes will 
be compared to the 100% TNA threshold.80 For example, the threshold is relevant to a fund buying 
CDS protection on a bond without having the underlying bond in the portfolio (naked long CDS81), or 
to a fund buying a bond and CDS protection on that bond to realize arbitrage gains, e.g., via “negative 
basis trades”82
2.2.2.2 Derivative Use under the General Restriction of the VaR Approaches 
 (according to CESR Guidelines (2010), arbitrage gains preclude the treatment as a 
“hedge”). However, in order to create leverage under this approach, CDS selling protection can only 
be used up to the point where its notional values reach 1% of a fund’s TNA.  
Funds using more than a negligible amount of complex derivatives or complex structures (where the 
commitment approach cannot be applied) are required to use the VaR approach to measure the 
increase in potential market risk due to derivative use. The VaR calculation might rely on historical 
simulation, Monte-Carlo simulation, or variance-covariance analysis – additional backtesting 
procedures and stress tests should be carried out to check the accuracy and quality of the VaR model 
as well as predict extreme-event outcomes. Between 2004 and mid-2011, the VaR (determined at the 
99% confidence level for a 10-business day holding period using parameters from the previous year) 
of a UCITS fund, including the different derivative constructs contained therein, was compared to the 
VaR of an appropriate, derivative-free, benchmark fund. The ratio of these two measures was not 
allowed to be larger than two (following the definitions provided by the regulation, this is called the 
“relative” VaR approach). As a consequence, funds using the relative VaR approach might have 
leverage higher than 100% of TNA because the approach is primarily restricting the increase in 
market risk under the assumption of normal market conditions. That is why funds using VaR have to 
further disclose the expected and potential leverage effect measured as the sum of the notional 
                                                          
80 Buying CDS on an underlying position that is highly correlated with a bond in the portfolio could be an additional way to 
hedge against a value loss of the bond (that would be considered as a “hedge”, if the conditions specified in the CESR 
Guidelines (2010) were met). In case CDS selling protection are used in combination with short-term (3 month) government 
securities to synthesize bond positions, their commitment values would not be added to be compared to the 100% TNA 
threshold under the commitment approach. 
81 Between 2004 and mid-2011, the general short sale prohibition was also applicable on derivatives and guaranteed that, in 
the case of physically settled derivatives, the underlying positions were within the portfolio at contract initiation. E.g., 
buying protection via CDS for a physical settlement required holding the underlying of the CDS in the portfolio at contract 
initiation. See § 4 Derivative Order/DerivateV (2011). 
82 See Oehmke and Zawadowski (2013) and “Get Positive Results With Negative Basis Trades”, September 23, 2011, 
[http://www.investopedia.com/articles/trading/08/negative-basis-trades.asp#axzz2Io8W8UVf, visited on 15.12.2012]. 
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amounts of derivatives (without netting positions) in their prospectuses and annual reports. For 
example, the potential leverage from sold CDS (and eventually also from bought CDS that are in a 
fund’s portfolio, which are then treated as if generating leverage) would be accounted for by the sum 
of notional values which could be higher than a fund’s TNA. Interestingly, this is not meant to impose 
an additional limit on leverage; however, funds are required to control for the leverage effect in the 
framework of their risk management systems based on self-developed leverage measures.83
Since mid-2011, funds are able to calculate either an “absolute” VaR or a “relative” VaR; both 
determined at the 99% confidence level for a 20-business day holding period using parameters from 
the previous year. The new VaR measure is subject to an “absolute” limit of 20% of a fund’s TNA. 
Starting July 1, 2011, rules in the Derivative Order/DerivateV (2011), §§ 28a to 28c, regulate the 
disclosure and declaration of certain information concerning derivative instruments. First, a fund’s 
prospectus must disclose the method used for calculating the potential market risk generated by 
derivatives as well as the expected and potential leverage effect in a short and comprehensive 
manner. Since mid-2011, the annual report not only has to include the methods used for calculating 
the potential market risk, but also the risk model and the underlying model parameters. Additionally, 
investment companies have to transmit reports about the kinds and purposes of their derivatives to 
the BaFin on a regular basis (at least once a year). The purposes of derivative use could be either to 
hedge, gain risk exposure, or to implement selected investment strategies. Moreover, investment 
companies have to file declarations on derivatives and their commitment values at the end of the 
reporting period. 
  
Furthermore, since mid-2011, the CESR Guidelines (2010) and the Derivative Order/DerivateV (2011) 
oblige EU/German funds to hold enough financial assets or/and liquid funds (including cash) to be 
able to meet all future obligations and payments from financial derivative instruments.84
                                                          
83 Regarding information contained in this and the next two paragraphs, please refer to the CESR Guidelines (2010), p. 29-36 
and the following BaFin Explanations on the respective Derivative Orders: BaFin-Erläuterung (2009) zu § 8 DerivateV (2004) 
and BaFin-Erläuterung (2011) zu den §§ 8-8a DerivateV (2011). 
 For cash 
settled derivatives, the fund has to hold sufficient liquid funds. For physically settled derivates, the 
fund has to have either the underlying position or a sufficient amount of liquid funds to buy this 
position (if the underlying asset is highly liquid and can be purchased on the market at any time). 
However, it is unclear whether these rules will be more effective than their U.S. counterparts as 
84 As opposed to U.S. funds, which are generally allowed to engage in short selling as long as they comply with the coverage 
requirement for derivatives, German funds are prohibited to short sell. This new coverage requirement was implemented 
because the prohibition of short selling derivatives was abolished in mid-2011 (however, it contained many exceptions 
already before). See § 4 Derivative Order/DerivateV (2011). Additionally, in Germany/the EU, funds are prohibited to short 
sell sovereign bonds via CDS since July 2010. See “Klares Ja zum Leerverkäufe-Verbot”, January 22, 2014, 
[http://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/leerverkaeufe136.html, visited on 22.01.2014]. 
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assets for coverage remain unspecified and funds can determine for themselves the method by which 
they set the coverage level for contracts with cash settlement (CESR Guidelines (2010)). 
Under the current regulation, funds that apply the VaR approach are able to chose which value they 
use (relative VaR together with the associated benchmark fund or absolute VaR) and how to calculate 
the value – e.g, by relying on historical simulation, Monte-Carlo simulation, or variance-covariance 
analysis. In addition to this flexibility, they are able to develop the leverage measure for risk 
management. Given this high level of flexibility, the potential leverage measure, which currently 
reflects the sum of the notional values of all derivatives, could be redefined to make the disclosed 
potential leverage more informative for investors and comparable across funds. For instance, one 
could adjust the calculation of potential leverage to reflect the sum of the notional values of 
derivatives used for speculation only and require all funds to report it in a uniform manner. Overall, 
although the general restrictions differ in Germany compared to the U.S., German funds can 
theoretically increase their leverage via derivatives such as CDS selling protection beyond their TNA 
(if the VaR measures lie within the specified ranges) as well. 
2.2.2.3 The Treatment of Derivatives under German/EU Issuer-Oriented Rules 
Whenever funds use derivatives they also have to check compliance with the issuer/counterparty 
rules that limit a fund’s exposure to the credit risks of these issuers. For purposes of the issuer-
oriented rules, they need to consider derivatives at their commitment values (CESR Guidelines 
(2010)). Funds applying a VaR approach have to use the commitment approach or determine the 
highest potential loss as a result of default by the issuer (if the commitment value cannot be 
calculated or is more conservative).85
German regulation generally requires funds to account for derivative counterparty exposure when a 
central counterparty is not involved in the transaction and if the mark to market valuation and the 
 According to the 5%/10%/40%-issuer rule, a fund can invest 5% 
of its assets in the securities and money market instruments of one particular issuer. Further, this 5% 
threshold can be shifted to 10% if it is specified in the contract terms and such exceptions do not 
exceed 40% of a fund’s TNA. For example, if a fund holds a bond XYZ, which trades at par (equal to 4% 
of its TNA), and sells protection on the same bond XYZ via CDS (with a notional amount of 1% that 
equals the commitment value) for replication, it will be exposed to the corporate issuer XYZ for 5% of 
TNA. In this example, the commitment approach accounts for the exposure to the CDS reference 
issuer consistently when compared to the valuation of bonds under this limit. 
                                                          
85 See the CESR Guidelines (2010), p. 38. 
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margin offset of the derivative are not performed daily. In order to account for counterparty 
exposure, funds have to comply with the 20%-cumulative issuer rule that restricts a fund’s 
investments in securities, money market instruments, bank deposits, together with the offset amount 
for counterparty credit risk of one financial institution (intermediary). On an individual securities 
level, the market value of the securities and money market instruments of one financial institution 
cannot be higher than 5% (10%) and the nominal value of a bank deposits cannot be higher than 20% 
of a fund’s TNA. Further, the regulator limits a fund’s exposure to the credit risk of the counterparties 
of OTC derivatives (the offset amount for counterparty credit risk measured by a derivative 
replacement value) to 5% of a fund’s TNA (or 10% in case of credit institutions).86 Between 2004 and 
mid-2011, the derivative counterparty exposure (called offset amount for counterparty credit risk) 
was measured as the sum of the positive derivative replacement values plus a safety margin. Since 
mid-2011, the derivative counterparty exposure is measured as the sum of the positive derivative 
replacement values plus the collateral provided to the counterparty. In addition, since 2004, the 
derivative counterparty exposure of a fund can be netted against the claim of the counterparty of the 
fund and the collateral provided by the counterparty under specific conditions.87
The highest level of issuer/counterparty exposure of 20% of TNA could be reached, for example, if a 
fund invests 10% of its TNA in asset-backed securities and bonds
  
88 of a bank ABC and simultaneously 
buys CDS from ABC for the protection of various references with a replacement value of 10% of TNA. 
Derivative replacement values could be approximated by market values (reflecting liquidation values 
at reporting date). Hence, the potential exposure to counterparties on a notional basis may, in fact, 
be multiple times higher than suggested by market values89
To summarize, all these issuer rules guarantee that funds place at most 5% to 10% of their TNA with 
one corporate issuer
 and create a problem if economic 
conditions change quickly (as happened during the financial crisis of 2007-2009). However, global 
rules on centrally cleared and “uncleared” derivatives are expected to minimize fund counterparty 
exposure in the EU/Germany in the near future. 
90
                                                          
86 See the CESR Guidelines (2010), p. 37-38. 
 and 20% with a single intermediary. In Germany, the general market 
87 These conditions are further specified in § 22 of the Derivative Order (2004)/DerivateV (2004), § 22 of the Derivative 
Order (2011)/DerivateV (2011), and the CESR Guidelines (2010), p. 38. Alternatively, UCITS funds may disregard the 
counterparty risk on the condition that counterparties provide collateral, which is valued at market price (after considering 
appropriate discounts) and exceeds the exposure to risk at any given time. See the CESR Guidelines (2010), p. 37-38. 
88 Alternatively, the fund might create these securities by investing in Treasury securities and selling CDS protection on ABS 
or bonds of this institution with a notional value of 10% of its TNA that, if equal to the commitment value, would instead be 
considered under the 20%-cumulative issuer rule in Germany/the EU. 
89 See the SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), p. 29, 53. 
90 Rules limiting fund investments in securities issued by the German government or EU member states slightly differ, e.g., 
according to § 206 (2) CIL/KAGB, 35% of a fund’s TNA can be invested in debt securities issued by the EU member states. 
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risk/leverage restriction interacts with the issuer-oriented rules to a higher extent than observed in 
the U.S. 
3 Similarities and Differences between Derivative and Leverage Regulation in the 
U.S. and Germany/the EU – An Overview and Some Recommendations  
Both in the U.S. and Germany, funds have to comply with general leverage restrictions and issuer-
oriented rules. The major differences between how U.S. and German funds account for derivatives 
under these rules are discussed below. 
3.1 General Leverage Restrictions in the U.S. and Germany 
Table 3 summarizes the general leverage restrictions in the U.S. and Germany. For more detailed 
information on the U.S. and German rules, please refer to sections 2.1.1 and 2.2.2, respectively. 
Table 3: General leverage restrictions in the U.S. and Germany 
General leverage restrictions in the U.S.   General leverage restrictions in Germany 
   
Bank borrowing is restricted by the 300% asset-
coverage rule to 33% of a fund’s net assets. 
However, temporary (< 60 days maturity) short-
term loans of up to 5% of a fund’s TNA are 
allowed. 
 Short-term loans (< 1 year maturity) of up to 10% 
of a fund’s TNA are allowed for either investment 
purposes or to bridge a liquidity gap, but not as a 
part of a fund’s long-term investment strategies. 
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General leverage restrictions in the U.S.   General leverage restrictions in Germany 
   
The level of potential obligations arising out of 
derivatives that generate third party 
obligations only is restricted to a fund’s TNA by 
requiring sufficient coverage. This concerns 
e.g., futures and forwards, written options, 
short CDS (as opposed to purchased options or 
long CDS, which are not covered by this rule). 
This rule is also applicable to other securities-
lending transactions e.g., short selling. In order 
to determine these potential obligations from 
long derivative positions, the SEC recommends 
using the purchase or exercise price of the 
contract (less the margin on deposit), and for 
short positions the market value of the security 
or the notional amount of the asset underlying 
a contract (e.g., a derivative). This is the 
traditional SEC viewpoint. Meanwhile, almost 
all of a fund’s securities can be “earmarked” on 
a fund’s books (alternatively, segregated with a 
custodian) and offsetting positions entered as 
coverage for this kind of “senior security 
transactions”.  
 Derivatives may, at most, double the potential 
market risk of a fund. Typically the “relative” or 
“absolute” VaR approach is used to measure the 
increase in potential market risk. Following the 
definitions provided by regulation between 2004 
and mid-2011, under the “relative” VaR approach, 
the relation of the VaR of the fund’s portfolio to a 
VaR of an appropriate, derivative-free, benchmark 
fund is allowed to be at most two. From mid-
2011, in addition to the relative VaR, funds are 
able to calculate an “absolute” VaR (both at the 
99% confidence level for a 20-business day 
(previously 10) holding period using parameters 
from the previous year). The new VaR measure is 
subject to an “absolute” limit of 20% of the value 
of the fund. If funds use simple derivatives or 
negligible amounts of complex derivatives (with 
loss potential below 1% of a fund’s TNA), the 
commitment approach can be applied, which 
restricts commitment values of derivatives used 
only for speculation (based on the market values 
of the underlying positions of derivatives) to a 
fund’s TNA. Additionally, since mid-2011, UCITS 
funds have to hold sufficient liquid funds for cash 
settled derivatives and the underlying position, or 
sufficient liquid funds, for physically settled 
derivatives (if the underlying asset is highly liquid 
and can be purchased on the market at any time). 
      
As presented in Table 3, the concept of “senior security” transactions and various coverage rules 
serve as excessive leverage/risk guardians at mutual funds in the U.S. Direct leverage in the form of 
bank borrowing is restricted by the 300% asset-coverage rule to 33% of a fund’s net assets, while 
temporary (60 days maturity) short-term loans of up to 5% of TNA can be taken out without 
complying with any coverage rules. In contrast to the U.S., German funds are allowed to take out 
short-term loans, with a maximum maturity of 1 year, up to 10% of TNA for either investment 
purposes or to bridge a liquidity gap, but not as a part of long-term investment strategies. 
Independent from the limits on direct leverage, U.S. and German funds face separate rules restricting 
derivative use. 
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The U.S. law restricts the level of potential obligations arising only from derivatives that generate 
third party obligations (e.g., futures and forwards, written options, short CDS)91 by requiring sufficient 
coverage to a fund’s TNA. However, the SEC observes that funds commonly underestimate these 
obligations (the amount that needs to be covered), which might, in consequence, allow funds to 
further increase their derivative holdings. Additionally, the use of derivatives with a loss limited to the 
premium paid and an unlimited potential gain (e.g., purchased options, long CDS) is not restricted. 
Thus, the sum of the notional values of derivatives that either do or do not create third party 
obligations can be higher than a fund’s TNA. In Germany, funds using derivatives face a cap on the 
potential market risk created by derivatives (as presented in Table 3), which must be quantified using 
the VaR approach.92
Most of the coverage and risk measurement rules in the U.S. and Europe take into account potential 
losses in portfolio investments under the assumption of normal market conditions. The U.S. 
segregation approach, for example, allows funds to quantify potential obligations in a less 
conservative manner than originally allowed as well as classify volatile securities, which are highly 
volatile by nature, as collateral for derivatives in a fund’s portfolio.
 Using a 99% confidence level for the VaR approach, the sum of the notional 
values of derivatives (or in the worst case, indirect leverage), can be extended beyond 100% of a 
fund’s TNA. In addition, since mid-2011, German funds have to comply with coverage rules that are, 
in principle, comparable to U.S. coverage requirements. However, it is unclear whether these rules 
are more effective than their U.S. counterparts as assets for coverage remain unspecified and funds 
can determine for themselves the method by which they set the coverage level for contracts with 
cash settlements (CESR Guidelines (2010)). As in the U.S, these rules will not necessary prevent funds 
from taking on additional risk by using derivatives with a loss limited to the premium paid and 
unlimited gain potential. Although general restrictions are structured differently in the U.S. and 
Germany, they similarly allow funds to keep derivative holdings with notional amounts higher than a 
fund’s TNA, and to build indirect leverage up to the size of a fund’s TNA (or even higher). 
Consequently, the flexibility provided by regulation with respect to derivative use and leverage makes 
it possible for funds to default solely due to derivative investments. 
93
                                                          
91 A fund’s TNA is the outcome of subtracting direct leverage from the total investments position. 
 This could be a problem under 
adverse market conditions where all securities are highly positively correlated. When it comes to 
handling individual derivative types, it could be helpful to have a list issued by the supervisory 
authority that describes, in detail, how much risk (in terms of money) needs to be covered (as it is 
92 Alternatively, the commitment values of derivatives used for speculation only are restricted to a fund’s TNA, but this 
threshold is of secondary importance as funds using this approach are, by definition, supposed to use mainly simple 
derivatives like long CDS written on single-name references and/or negligible amounts of complex derivatives. 
93 See the SEC Staff No-Action Letter to MLAM (1996). 
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done in CESR Guidelines (2010)) and by which type of securities and assets. Similarly, the new EU 
coverage requirements do not clearly state the amount that needs to be covered and by which “liquid 
funds”. Thus, it might be helpful to require funds to use relatively risk-free coverage that is high 
enough in value to account for all potential obligations, which is often not the case for market values 
of derivatives. Rather, notional amounts (e.g., sold CDS) or some figure in between (e.g., futures) 
should be used. Furthermore, the European VaR approach directly assumes normal market conditions 
for evaluating the risk of portfolio loss for a particular investment company, even when portfolios 
include many complex derivatives (calculated using a 99% confidence level for a 20-business day 
holding period – formerly 10-business day holding period – and parameters from the previous year). 
The financial crisis of 2007–2009 demonstrates that investors and regulators have to consider states 
of the world that are far from normal. Additionally, if the applied risk management methods average 
out the extreme outcomes and funds only communicate these averages to the public, some investors 
might perceive the respective investment vehicles as nearly risk free and remain unaware that their 
investments could potentially disappear during a crisis. In fact, one could argue that there is only a 
limited need for risk control under normal circumstances and therefore require funds to report the 
expected shortfall given the occurrence of an unexpected event (Hull (2012)).  
Germany’s/the EU’s decision to implement risk control mechanisms (the VaR approach and stress 
testing procedures) used in the banking industry for the mutual fund industry (in 2001 in the EU and 
2004 in Germany) was driven by the belief that the rules successfully regulate banks. However, there 
are some doubts about the effectiveness of these rules (and of the stress testing mechanism applied, 
e.g., Acharya and Steffen (2013)) as some European banks that performed well under recent stress 
tests later needed assistance from the European Community. Currently, German/EU funds are 
required to report all parameters and methods used to determine the minimum, mean, and 
maximum VaR values. However, this information will not necessarily enable regulators, auditors, or 
other interested parties to replicate the results. One recommendation would be to prepare a 
separate highest potential obligations statement that shows the highest potential obligations from 
short selling and other securities-lending transactions, futures, forwards, foreign exchange contracts, 
credit default swaps, interest rate swaps, and total return swaps subdivided into long and short 
positions. By reading the statement of operations, one would then be able to identify the impact of 
the different financial instruments on a fund’s TNA at a specific reporting date and, using the highest 
potential obligations statement, determine the highest potential obligations from individual portfolio 
positions. An additional table could distinguish between obligations that do not require coverage 
(because of hedging or other non-speculative investment strategies) and those that do 
(leverage/speculation). As funds have portfolio assets to cover all the potential obligations from 
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investments and leverage, coverage positions should be grouped in the second part (e.g., into 
positions held in segregated accounts kept with third parties, underlying securities preserved as 
collateral on funds’ books, etc.). Since FASB disclosure rules introduced during 2009 (FASB ASC 815-10 
(2009)) already require U.S. funds to conservatively value potential future obligations from 
derivatives by type (and list the amount of collateral provided) for disclosure purposes, one could 
arrange this information in an easily accessible table.94
In order to prevent funds from significant losses during a crisis while also allowing funds to pursue 
(non-)speculative derivative strategies that benefit investors, regulators could restrict the leverage 
from speculative derivative strategies and bank borrowing to a reasonable level below 100% of a 
fund’s assets, e.g., 50% in addition to (or instead of)
 The proposed tables could help the public and 
the regulators to more precisely approximate the loss potential of a fund. 
95 the existing rules. The extent to which the 
limits are utilized could be disclosed by funds in the prospectuses and periodic reports, while a 
highest potential obligations statement and a breakdown of coverage table (including the types of 
collateral) could be provided in periodic reports.96
3.2 The Treatment of Derivatives under Issuer-Oriented Rules in the U.S. and Germany 
 This information should be comparable across 
funds and accessible to the public and regulators. 
Table 4 summarizes the regulations concerning the treatment of derivatives under issuer-oriented 
rules in the U.S. and Germany that restrict a fund’s investments in the securities of particular issuers. 
For more detailed information on the U.S. and German rules, please refer to sections 2.1.2 and 
2.2.2.3, respectively. 
  
                                                          
94 The SEC Letter to the GCotICI (2010) shows that funds did not uniformly disclose derivatives information until 2010. 
Currently, the information on future potential obligations from individual derivatives (and collateral provided) is spread 
across the annual report – it can be found in the footnotes of the schedule of portfolio holdings or in the notes part under 
single derivative descriptions. For example, see the Vanguard bond fund reports issued from 2004-2010. 
95 An additional measure of notional values of derivatives used for non-speculative purposes could then be limited to e.g., a 
fund’s net assets.  
96 Data availability is an additional issue in Germany: although funds have to disclose their annual and semi-annual reports 
in the „Online Bundesanzeiger“, most of them cannot be found on this website. Structuring the website like the website of 
the SEC (filings section) could benefit investors, researchers, and regulators alike. For example, searching for the UIL S.A. 
Jahresbericht (30.09.2007) for the Investmentfonds UniEuroKapital Corporates A or the DWS S.A. Halbjahresbericht 
(30.06.2007) for the Investmentfonds DWS Euro-Corp Bonds does not provide results. 
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Table 4: The treatment of derivatives under issuer-oriented rules in the U.S. and Germany 
Issuer-related rules in the U.S.   Issuer-related rules in Germany 
   
Under the issuer-related rules in the U.S., 
derivatives are, in general, accounted for at 
market values to guarantee a fund’s 
independence from a few issuers or 
counterparties. 
 
 Under the issuer-related rules in Germany, 
the exposure to the reference issuer of the 
derivative and to the counterparty has to be 
accounted for in order to protect a fund 
from issuer/counterparty credit risk. 
Commitment values, or the highest potential 
loss given the default of the issuer (if the 
commitment value cannot be determined or 
is more conservative), are used to value the 
exposure to the reference issuer of 
derivatives. 
   
5%/75%-diversification requirement: A fund 
classified as diversified is not allowed to invest 
more than 5% of its TNA in securities of one 
particular issuer (and to keep more than 10% of 
the outstanding voting securities of this issuer) 
for 75% of its asset value. Under the 
diversification requirement, a fund’s exposure to 
the reference issuer of derivatives (not necessary 
to the counterparty) has to be accounted for at 
market values. 
 5%/10%/40%-issuer rule: Under this rule, a 
UCITS fund is not allowed to invest more 
than 5% of its TNA in securities of one 
particular issuer. The contract terms may 
further specify that the 5% rule can be 
extended to 10% up to a maximum of 40% 
of a fund’s TNA. The commitment value, or 
the highest potential loss given the default 
of an issuer, must be determined in order to 
quantify the exposure to the reference 
issuer.  
   
Portfolio Concentration requirement: 
Concentration within an industry is assumed to 
take place whenever a fund invests more than 
25% of its assets in an industry (with industry 
classifications determined by a fund). Under this 
requirement, funds must account for the 
exposure to the reference issuer of the derivative 
(not necessary to the counterparty). Funds are 
allowed to use market values or notional 
amounts to value derivatives. However, funds 
seem to calculate industry exposure to the 
reference issuers of derivatives most often using 
market values. 
 20%-cumulative issuer rule: This rule 
applies for financial institutions 
(intermediaries) that provide funds in 
Germany with securities, money market 
instruments, bank deposits and contracts 
creating counterparty exposure (including 
derivatives). On the individual securities 
level, investments in securities and money 
market instruments cannot be higher than 
5% (10%) and bank deposits 20% of a fund’s 
TNA. The derivative counterparty exposure, 
measured by derivative replacement values, 
may not exceed 5% of a fund’s assets (or 
10% for credit institutions). 
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Issuer-related rules in the U.S.   Issuer-related rules in Germany 
   
5% Limit on Investing in Securities-Related 
Issuers: Under specific conditions of 12d3-1 of 
the ICA, funds are allowed to invest 5% of their 
TNA in securities provided by securities-related 
issuers, e.g., brokers, dealers, underwriters, or 
investment advisers with derivatives considered 
at market values. Under the conditions specified 
in 12d3-1 of the ICA, derivatives are perceived as 
debt securities and can be accounted for using 
the market or notional value of derivatives 
(however, the SEC observes that funds often use 
notional amounts to perform these calculations). 
  
      
The U.S. issuer limits focus on the current portfolio composition and on restricting a fund’s exposure 
to the credit risk of various issuers. Hence, the treatment of derivatives, as indicated in Table 4, 
conceptually differs from the consideration of derivatives under general leverage restrictions (“senior 
securities” limitations). For purposes of the 5%/75%-diversification requirement, the same derivative 
valuation rules apply as for calculating a fund’s TNA: The “market value” is applied for exchange-
traded derivatives and the “fair value” for OTC derivatives. Additionally, under the portfolio 
concentration requirement, funds can choose to use the notional value of derivatives. Although the 
potential exposure attainable through derivatives consists of two parts (the reference issuer and 
counterparty risks), it remains unclear whether only the reference-issuer exposure or both the 
reference-issuer and counterparty exposures should be considered for the purposes of the 
diversification and portfolio concentration requirements (SEC Concept Release (2011)). In my view, 
regulators could rely on rules that capture the counterparty risk, such as the U.S. 5% limit on investing 
in securities-related issuers and global rules on mandatory central clearing.97
Under the issuer- and industry-related rules in the U.S., it would be useful to further distinguish 
between derivatives used for hedging purposes and those used for non-hedging purposes, and to 
only limit those that are used for non-hedging purposes (depending on the economic exposure 
created), as required by German/the EU regulation. Under German/EU regulation, if CDS buying or 
selling protections are used to hedge for existing portfolio positions, they do not need to be 
considered under the issuer limits that restrict reference-issuer exposure (insured securities are also 
not considered under these limits). As discussed in sections 2.1.2.1 and 2.2.2.3, synthesized bonds 
created by using CDS selling protection should be accounted for at the market values of the 
  
                                                          
97 CCPs face much higher capital requirements than the fund counterparties previously involved in derivative transactions. 
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underlying positions of CDS (or for simplification notional amounts) in order to be valued consistently 
with regular bonds under issuer-oriented rules (and not the market (fair) values of CDS).98
In Germany, derivatives are valued using either the commitment approach or the maximum loss 
given default of the issuer in order to ensure compliance with the issuer rules. In addition, these rules 
consider the way derivatives are used in combination with other portfolio securities.
 Overall, 
since funds can circumvent the goal of the diversification and portfolio concentration rules by simply 
selling CDS and accounting for them at the market (fair) values, a concerted rule to value derivatives 
under both requirements should be designed. This rule should restrict exposure to a few individual 
issuers by accounting for the way derivatives are used in combination with other portfolio securities. 
99
In the U.S., funds account for derivative counterparty exposure if derivatives are not exchange-traded 
or otherwise centrally cleared and can be perceived as securities issued by securities-related issuers 
(e.g., brokers, dealers, underwriters, and advisers). If this is the case, derivatives (as well as the other 
securities of this particular issuer) are considered at their market value and can reach up to 5% of a 
fund’s net assets under the 5% limit on investing in securities-related issuers. In Germany, funds 
account for counterparty exposure by relying on derivative replacement values under the 20% 
cumulative-issuer rule for financial institutions. Under this rule, the counterparty exposure cannot 
exceed 5% of a fund’s assets (10% for credit institutions) if there isn’t a central counterparty involved 
in the transaction and if the mark to market valuation as well as the margin offset of the derivative 
are not performed daily.
 For instance, if 
CDS selling protection on single-name securities are used to synthesize bonds, the larger of either the 
market value of the underlying position or the notional amount of the CDS is considered under the 
5%/10%/40%-issuer rule. Assuming that the underlying bonds trade at par (below par), the market 
value of the underlying position (CDS notional value) is larger and better suits the purposes of the 
issuer-oriented rules in comparison to the CDS market (fair) values applicable under U.S. issuer limits. 
100  In the U.S., the market (fair) values of the “uncleared” CDS buying 
protection101
                                                          
98 Alternatively, instead of using the market values of the underlying positions of derivatives, one could quantify the 
reference-issuer exposure on a notional value basis for simplicity reasons. 
 (as well as other securities from the same issuer) are restricted to 5% of a fund’s assets 
under the 5% limit on investing in securities-related issuers. In Germany, the replacement values of 
such CDS (approximately equal to market (fair) values) are restricted to 5% and might, together with 
other securities from the same issuer, reach up to 20% of a fund’s assets, which is higher than the 
99 Although the commitment values of derivatives used to synthesize securities are accounted for under German issuer-
oriented rules, they would not be considered under the general leverage restriction based on the commitment approach. 
100 In the case of swaps, as for many other derivatives, counterparties of the contracts ask for posting collateral under the 
ISDA Master Agreement, CSA and the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) to support the credit exposure to the other counterparties. See 
the CFRS Derivatives and Leverage Report (2010), p. 37-38.  
101 Irrespective of whether long CDS “insure” the fund against the default of a bond or are used for speculation, the fund 
expects getting the notional amount (minus collateral) in the case of a bond default from the counterparty. 
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amount allowed under U.S. regulation. Nevertheless, these rules prevent funds from suffering high 
losses due to counterparty failure. This is in line with Helwege and Zhangs’ (2013) findings that banks 
following similar diversification regulations only faced a small amount of counterparty exposure, 
which did not typically cause contagion around the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
Regarding a fund’s exposure to OTC derivatives, it is important to note that during the financial crisis 
of 2007-2009, claims against AIG rose dramatically within a short period of time. In consequence, AIG 
(in its role as a CDS counterparty) was unable to offset margins and pay its obligations from CDS 
contracts before the intervention of the U.S. government (Brice (2011)). Similarly, Lehman Brothers, 
one of the main fund counterparties, suddenly defaulted because of risky investments in asset-
backed securities and was unable to perform under existing CDS contracts (Hull (2012)). These events 
are why the G-20 countries agreed to oblige all derivatives to be centrally cleared by 2013/2014 and 
on the margin requirements (initial and variation margin) of the CCPs that directly restrict the 
counterparty exposure of funds. After full implementation of central clearing, there will be limited 
need to restrict counterparty exposure, unless the margin requirements and the capital requirements 
of the CCPs prove to be too low to prevent them from defaulting. The benefits can also be 
undermined due to the fragmentation of clearing services (Duffie and Zhu (2011))). Mandatory 
clearing started in the U.S. in March 2013, while in the EU it is anticipated to begin in the second half 
of 2014 at the earliest after the entry-into-force of the technical standards prepared by the ESMA.102 
Rules with regard to “uncleared” swaps were recently drafted, yet it remains unclear when (and in 
what final form) they will enter into force globally103
4 Conclusion 
 and hence, whether they will fulfill their 
objective. The imperative question remains of whether or not rules implemented on a national level 
will be consistent enough, even after resolving all open issues, to avoid global regulatory arbitrage.  
This study analyzes regulation with respect to leverage and derivative holdings of mutual funds in the 
U.S. and Germany/the EU by presenting the relevant rules and highlighting the main similarities and 
differences regarding the level of flexibility in both countries. In particular, the study discusses the 
application of existing regulation on CDS and the potential of mutual funds to use CDS for speculative 
                                                          
102 See “ESMA informs European Commission of its intention to ease certain frontloading requirements under EMIR“, May 5, 
2014, [http://www.esma.europa.eu/news/ESMA-informs-European-Commission-its-intention-ease-certain-frontloading-
requirements-under-EMI?t=579&o=page%2FOTC-derivatives-and-clearing-obligation, visited on 01.07.2014]. 
103 For the information contained in this paragraph, refer to the SEC Press Release (2012-251), “Timing tension – Europe 
clearing deadline set to slip”, October 24, 2013, [http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/feature/2302306/timing-tension-
europe-clearing-deadline-set-to-slip, visited on 20.12.2013], “Final Margin Framework for Uncleared Derivatives Released 
by Basel Committee and IOSCO Board Excludes Nonfinancial End-users from Requirements to Post Margin”, November 11, 
2013, [http://www.velaw.com/resources/FinalMarginFrameworkUnclearedDerivativesBaselCommitteeIOSCOBoard.aspx, 
visited on 20.12.2013] and BCBS & IOSCO (2013). 
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purposes. The comparison reveals the following: First, funds in the U.S. and Germany face restrictions 
on short-term bank borrowing of up to 33.3% and 10% of a fund’s net assets, respectively. Second, 
independent from the limits on direct leverage, rules, which are structured differently in both 
countries, allow funds to extend leverage beyond their net assets by using derivatives. To avoid 
potentially high losses, it is advisable that regulators restrict direct and indirect leverage to a 
reasonable level below a fund’s net asset value. Third, various issuer-oriented rules in the U.S. and 
Germany/the EU account differently for reference issuer and counterparty exposures from 
derivatives, with U.S. funds receiving higher discretion to undervalue the exposure to reference 
issuers. In order to guarantee a fund’s independence from a few individual issuers and enhance 
investor protection with regard to undesirable changes in the asset allocations and risk profiles of 
funds, the respective exposures to issuers should be adequately accounted for. Regarding 
counterparty exposure from derivatives, funds are strictly regulated. In addition, they are expected to 
comply with strict global rules on mandatory central clearing for the majority of derivatives, and on 
“uncleared” derivatives in the near future. However, all other highlighted issues remain, for which the 
study proposes solutions that could benefit investors and regulators alike. 
Overall, the flexibility provided by regulation with respect to derivatives and leverage makes it 
theoretically possible for funds to default solely due to their derivative investments. Furthermore, 
funds in the U.S. face higher discretion to increase the risks of their asset allocations via derivatives 
without being detected compared to funds in Germany/the EU. These results are highly relevant for 
the public and regulators in both countries.  
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Appendix A  
This appendix shows the amount of securities and assets originally required by U.S. regulation for the 
coverage of selected derivatives and short selling as well as how regulation changes over time (until 
2010). 
Source Operations & suggested coverage 
    
SEC Staff No-
Action Letter 
to Dryfus 
(1987), p. 1-
2 
 "In Investment Company Act Rel. No. 7221 (June 9, 1972)(‘Release 7221’), the 
staff stated it would not object if a fund purchased or sold commodities or 
commodities contracts subject to certain restrictions, including 300-percent asset 
coverage of the contracts and other borrowings. (...) In Release 10666, the 
Commission discussed potential senior security and leveraging problems arising 
from certain own trading practices. The release sets forth means by which funds 
can eliminate these problems, and thereby avoid the restrictions on trading in 
commodities set forth in Release 7221, through the segregation of fund assets. 
(...) The staff has subsequently developed various segregation requirements for 
funds. To comply with these requirements, a fund with a long position in a 
futures or forward contract, or that sells a put option, must establish a 
segregated account (not with a futures commission merchant or broker) 
containing cash or certain liquid assets equal to the purchase price of the 
contract or the strike price of the put option (less any margin on deposit). (...) 
Segregation of assets is not required if a fund 'covers' a long position or the sale 
of a put option. For example, instead of segregating assets, a fund that has a long 
position in a futures or forward contract could purchase a put option on the same 
futures or forward contract with a strike price as high or higher than the price of 
the contract held by the fund. A fund that has sold a put option could sell short 
the instruments or currency underlying the put option at the same or higher 
price than the strike price of the put option. Similarly, the fund could purchase a 
put option, if the strike price of the purchased put option is the same or higher 
than the strike price of the put option sold by the fund." 
 
    
SEC Staff No-
Action Letter 
to Dryfus 
(1987), p. 1-
2 
 "For short positions in futures or forward contracts, sales of call options, and 
short sales of securities, a fund may establish a segregated account (not with a 
futures commission merchant or broker) with cash or certain liquid assets that, 
when added to the amounts deposited with a futures commission merchant or a 
broker as margin, equal the market value of the instruments or currency 
underlying the futures or forward contracts, call options, and short sales (but are 
not less than the strike price of the call option or the market price at which the 
short position or short sales were established). (...) In addition, a fund that 
engages in short sales, short positions and sales of call options need not 
segregate fund assets if it "covers" these positions in the following ways. A fund 
selling a security short my own that security or hold a call option on that security 
with a strike price no higher than the price at which the security was sold. (...) A 
fund with a short position in a futures or forward contract may cover by owning 
the instruments or currency underlying the contract. A fund may also cover this 
position by holding a call option permitting the fund to purchase the same 
futures or forward contract at a price no higher than the price at which the short 
position was established." 
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Source Operations & suggested coverage 
SEC Staff No-
Action Letter 
to Dryfus 
(1987), p. 3 
 "A fund selling a call option on a security or stock index may cover its position by 
holding the same security (or, in the case of a stock index, a portfolio of stocks 
substantially replicating the movement of the index) underlying the call option. A 
fund may also cover by holding a separate call option on the same security or 
stock index with a strike price no higher than the strike price of the call option 
sold by the fund. (...) A fund selling a call option on a futures or forward contract 
may cover by entering into a long position in the same contract at a price no 
higher than the strike price of the call option. Similarly, a fund may cover by 
owning the instruments or currency underlying the futures or forward contract. A 
fund could also cover this position by holding a separate call option permitting it 
to purchase the same futures or forward contract at a price no higher than the 
strike price of the call option sold by the fund." 
 
    
SEC Staff No-
Action Letter 
to RSIT 
(1995), p. 3 
 "We would not recommend that the Commission take enforcement action under 
Section 18(f) of the 1940 Act if a Fund that engages in short selling maintains in a 
segregated account on the books of its custodian an amount that, when 
combined with the amount of collateral deposited with the broker in connection 
with the short sale, equals the current market value of the security sold short." 
 
    
SEC Staff No-
Action Letter 
to MLAM 
(1996), p. 5  
 "Accordingly, we would not recommend that the Commission commence 
enforcement action under Section 18 of the Investment Company Act if a Fund 
covers its obligations that may otherwise be deemed to be senior securities by 
maintaining a segregated account on the books of its custodian, and includes in 
that segregated account cash or liquid securities (regardless of type) having an 
aggregate value, measured on a daily basis, at least equal to the amount of the 
covered obligations." 
 
    
SEC Staff 
Letter from 
Lawrence A. 
Friend 
(1997), p. 3 
 “Typically, investment companies have designated securities to be segregated on 
the records of their custodians. The staff has been asked by registrants whether it 
would be consistent to segregate accounts on the fund's records. The staff has 
indicated that it would not object if assets segregated under Section 18 were 
designated solely on the fund's records and not designated on the fund's 
custodian's records.” 
 
CFRS 
Derivatives 
and 
Leverage 
Report 
(2010),  
p. 14-15 
 
"In December 2005, the SEC staff informally embraced a flexible approach for 
covering cash-settled futures and forwards. As in the case of interest rate swaps, 
in connection with the review and comment on fund registration statements, the 
staff acquiesced to the segregation of the net amount due on the contract, rather 
than the larger amount required to be segregated under the Dreyfus Letter. (...) 
For cash-settled futures and forwards, the SEC staff indicated that a fund may 
segregate assets equal to the net amount owed under the contract, as 
determined daily, less any margin that must be posted with a futures commission 
merchant. For purposes of the SEC staff’s position, a cash-settled contract is one 
in which no physical delivery is permitted on the settlement date; instead, the 
parties to the contract must settle with cash." 
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Appendix B 
This appendix gives an overview of legal changes in Germany between 2004 and mid-2011. 
Content of legal revision Important statutory orders and legal interpretations 
2004 Investment Modernization Act "IMA“ (Investmentmodernisierungsgesetz "InvMG“) 
      • The Investment Act “IA” (Investmentgesetz “InvG”) 
and Investment Tax Act “ITA” 
(Investmentsteuergesetz “InvStG”) came into effect 
for all home and foreign mutual funds on January 1, 
2004, while some parts of prior regulations were 
valid until February 13, 2007 
• Derivative Order/DerivateV (2004) 
    
• Extension of investment opportunities and 
investment limits, especially the use of derivatives as 
a part of the investment strategy  
 
    
• Hedge funds were first permitted   
      
2007 Investment Amendment Act "IAA“ (Investmentänderungsgesetz "InvÄndG“) 
      
• Effective December 28, 2007; some parts of prior 
regulation valid until July 1, 2010 
• BaFin Explanation (2009) on Derivative Order 
(2004)/BaFin-Erläuterung (2009) zu DerivateV (2004) 
    
• Further extension of investment opportunities and 
removal of certain investment limits, in particular, 
legal introduction of infrastructure and other special 
investment funds, such as microfinance funds 
  
    
• Discontinuation of double supervision by 
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 
(“BaFin”) and Deutsche Bundesbank in favor of sole 
supervision by BaFin   
        
2011 UCITS-IV-Implementation-Act "UCITS-IV-IA“ (OGAW-IV-Umsetzungsgesetz "OGAW-IV-UmsG“) 
        •  Effective July 1, 2011, some parts of prior regulation 
valid until December 31, 2012   
• Three statutory orders and three BaFin explanations 
replaced old interpretations: 
    
• EU-wide harmonization of supervisory rules, 
simplification of cross-border notification procedures 
(complete EU-Passport) and mutual fund mergers 
(and enablement of asset poolings by introduction of 
master-feeder structures) 
• BaFin-Explanation (2011) on Derivative Order 
(2011)/BaFin-Erläuterung (2011) zu DerivateV 
(2011), The minimum requirements for risk 
management of investment companies (2010) / Die 
Mindestanforderungen an das Risikomanagement 
von Investmentgesellschaften (InvMaRisk (2010)) 
and BaFin explanation on InvMaRisk (2010), and 
Ordinance specifying rules of conduct and 
organizational requirements for investment services 
enterprises / Investment-, Verhaltens- und 
Organisationsverordnung (“InvVerOV”) and BaFin 
explanation on InvVerOV (2011) 
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Appendix C 
This appendix shows an excerpt from the CESR Guidelines (2010), p. 8-9 about the commitment 
values to account for derivative exposure of selected derivatives used under various rules by 
EU/German funds. 
Derivatives  Commitment values  
  Interest Rate Future, Currency Future   Number of contracts * notional contract size 
   
Equity (or Bond) Future 
 
Number of contracts * notional contract size * market price of 
underlying equity share (or market price of the cheapest-to-deliver 
reference bond) 
   
Index Futures  Number of contracts * notional contract size * index level 
   
Plain Vanilla Bond Option 
 
Notional contract value * market value of underlying reference bond 
* delta  
   
Plain Vanilla Equity Option 
 
Number of contracts * notional contract size * market value of 
underlying equity share * delta 
   
Plain Vanilla Interest Rate Option  Notional contract value * delta  
   
Plain Vanilla Currency Option  Notional contract value of currency leg(s) * delta  
   
Plain Vanilla Index Options  Number of contracts * notional contract size * index level * delta  
   
Plain Vanilla Options on Futures 
 
Number of contracts * notional contract size * market value of 
underlying asset * delta  
   
Plain Vanilla Swaptions  Reference swap commitment conversion amount (see below) * delta  
   
Warrants and Rights 
 
Number of shares/bonds * market value of underlying referenced 
instrument * delta 
   
Plain Vanilla Fixed/Floating Rate 
Interest Rate and Inflation Swaps  
Market value of underlying (the notional value of the fixed leg may 
also be applied) 
   
Currency Swap, Cross currency 
Interest Rate Swaps  
Notional value of currency leg(s)   
   
Basic Total Return Swap  Underlying market value of reference asset(s) 
   
Non-Basic Total Return Swap  Cumulative underlying market value of both legs of the TRS 
   
Single Name Credit Default Swap 
 
Protection Seller – The higher of the market value of the underlying 
reference asset or the notional value of the Credit Default Swap.  
Protection Buyer – Market value of the underlying reference asset  
   
Contract for Differences 
 
Number of shares/bonds * market value of underlying referenced 
instrument  
   
Forward Rate Agreement (FX forward) 
  
Notional value (notional value of currency leg(s)) 
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Appendix D  
This appendix shows the separate paragraphs of the Investment Act/Investmentgesetz (IA/InvG) 
limiting investments, in particular securities, between 2004 and mid-2011 and lists the new 
corresponding rules of the Capital Investment Law/Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch (CIL/KAGB), which took 
effect on July 22, 2013. 
§ of the IA/InvG  § of the CIL/KAGB  
   
§ 47 IA/InvG  § 193 CIL/KAGB 
   
§ 48 IA/InvG  § 194 CIL/KAGB 
   
§ 49 IA/InvG  § 195 CIL/KAGB 
   
§ 50 IA/InvG  § 196 CIL/KAGB 
   
§ 51 IA/InvG  § 197 CIL/KAGB 
   
§ 52 IA/InvG  § 198 CIL/KAGB 
   
§ 53 IA/InvG  § 199 CIL/KAGB 
   
§ 54 IA/InvG  § 200 CIL/KAGB 
   
§ 57 IA/InvG  § 203 CIL/KAGB 
   
§ 59 IA/InvG  § 205 CIL/KAGB 
   
§ 60 IA/InvG  § 206 CIL/KAGB 
   
§ 61 IA/InvG  § 207 CIL/KAGB 
   
§ 62 IA/InvG  § 208 CIL/KAGB 
   
§ 63 IA/InvG  § 209 CIL/KAGB 
   
§ 64 IA/InvG  § 210 CIL/KAGB 
   
§ 65 IA/InvG  § 211 CIL/KAGB 
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